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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to a writ 
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review a decision 
regarding the relinquishment and adoptive placement of an infant 
born out of wedlock. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that 
L.D.S. Social Services engaged in "state action" by accepting 
custody of an infant born out of wedlock and placing the infant 
for adoption. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the 
distinction between the rights of unwed mothers and fathers in 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4 is valid under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) adequately protected plaintiff's due process 
rights. 
4. Whether plaintiff may raise the issue of adoption by 
acknowledgment for the first time in the Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following statutory and constitutional provisions are 
set out verbatim in the Addendum (Add. 45-46): 
1. U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4 and 78-30-12; 
2. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1; 
3. Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the putative father of an 
illegitimate infant challenging the constitutionality of U.C.A. 
§ 78-30-4, pursuant to which the mother relinquished the infant 
for adoption and the father's paternal rights were terminated. 
(R. 2; Court of Appeals Opinion, hereafter "Slip Op.," at 1, 
Add. 1.) Plaintiff initially filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. Following 
discovery and a hearing, the federal court denied plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction to obtain immediate custody of 
the child and granted defendants' motion to dismiss on 
abstention grounds. (Slip Op., Add. 4-5; Swayne v. L.D.S. 
Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).) 
Plaintiff refiled the action in state district court. 
Following further discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the 
state court denied plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary 
injunction and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
(Slip Op., Add. 5; Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, hereafter "Findings," 
R. 68, Add. 17; Judgment, R. 190, Add. 21.) 
Plaintiff appealed the summary judgment and moved for 
summary reversal and an injunction for custody pending appeal. 
A law and motion panel of the Court of Appeals denied both 
motions, following briefing and a hearing, and set the matter 
for expedited briefing and argument on the merits. (Add. 
23-24.) A different panel of the Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed the district court's holding of no state action, but 
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upheld the constitutionality of section 78-30-4, on its face and 
as applied to plaintiff. (Slip Op., Add. 7-16.) The Court of 
Appeals Opinion is officially reported as Swayne v. L.D.S. 
Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988). 
Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review 
the Court of Appeals rulings on the constitutional issues, and 
defendants subsequently cross-petitioned for review of the state 
action ruling. This Court granted both petitions on February 
16, 1989. (Add. 25.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a 22-year-old single black man who, at all 
times relevant to this action, has resided in an apartment in 
Salt Lake County. In late 1985 he began dating P., a 
20-year-old single white woman who, at all times relevant to 
this action, has resided at her parents' home in Salt Lake 
County. Throughout the time plaintiff dated P., before and 
during the pregnancy, and even after the baby's birth, plaintiff 
continued to date and engage in sexual relations with other 
women. Yet, because of plaintiff's unstable financial 
circumstances, P. often paid his rent and living expenses and 
loaned him her car for up to four or five days a week. (Slip 
Op., Add. 1; I Tr. 8, 24-25, 30, 38-39; Swayne Dep., R. 109, pp. 
3-16, 22-25; Paxman Aff't, R. 96, 1! 1-2, 5, Add. 32-33; 
Findings, U1F 1-2, Add. 18.) 
HJ Tr." refers to the transcript of the first part of 
the state preliminary injunction hearing, identified as R. 203, 
and "II Tr." will refer to the separately bound transcript of 
the second part of the same hearing, identified as R. 204. 
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When plaintiff learned in October of 1986 that P. was 
pregnant, he became angry and, until March of 1987, denied that 
the baby was his. Plaintiff refused to marry P. because "[i]t 
didn't appeal" to him. In fact, at no time prior to 
relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services did plaintiff 
ever offer to marry P. or to live with and support her and the 
baby- Even after the relinquishment, when plaintiff proposed a 
secret "paper" marriage to enhance his court case, he still 
wanted to live apart from P., so she refused. (Slip Op., Add. 
1-2; I Tr. 9, 25-28; Paxman Aff't HU 2, 4, Add. 32-33; Swayne 
Dep. 26, 31-32; Findings Hlf 3-4, Add. 18.) 
P. discussed with plaintiff during the pregnancy the 
possibility of placing the baby for adoption, explaining that 
her parents favored adoption because of the baby's racial mix 
and the couple's racial and religious incompatibility. In fact, 
P. called and made an appointment with LDS Social Services in 
March of 1987 to discuss adoption, but later decided to postpone 
the appointment. P. never told plaintiff that she would not 
relinquish the baby for adoption. Plaintiff told P. that 
adoption should be her decision, but suggested to P. that if she 
kept the baby she and the baby could live with his mother in the 
mother's apartment if she supported herself and the baby and 
paid half the rent. (Slip Op., Add. 2; I Tr. 10, 28-30; II Tr. 
16-17; Paxman Aff't Ml 3-4, Add. 32-33; Swayne Dep. 33-34, 
54-55; Findings IF 5, Add. 18.) 
The baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on June 4, 
1987. Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of the 
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birth and visited P. and the baby in the hospital. Hospital 
personnel explained to P. that the father's name could not be 
entered on the birth certificate unless he signed an 
acknowledgment of paternity form supplied by the hospital. P. 
informed plaintiff of the acknowledgment requirement and showed 
him the form, but he refused to sign it. Consequently, the 
baby's birth certificate shows no father, and the baby was given 
P.'s surname. P.'s mother assumed financial responsibility for 
the hospital and doctor expenses and took P. and the baby from 
the hospital to their home on June 6. Plaintiff paid none of 
the medical expenses, except for one $45.00 prenatal checkup, 
and has assumed no responsibility for the subsequent support of 
P. and the baby. (Slip Op., Add. 2-3; Paxman Aff't U 6, Add. 
33-34; Brockert Aff't, R. 105, Add. 41; I Tr. 31-34; II Tr. 
17-18, 38; Findings HH 6-8, Add. 18-19.) 
On the afternoon of Monday, June 8, 1987, P. took the 
baby and, with her parents, met with a counselor from LDS Social 
Services regarding possible placement of the baby for adoption. 
P. told the counselor that the baby's father had no interest in 
marriage nor in living with and supporting her and the baby. 
The counselor discussed the available options with P., stressed 
that P. should do what she thought best for herself and the 
baby, and even offered temporary foster care for the baby until 
P. made her decision. P. considered and weighed all the 
circumstances, including plaintiff's lack of commitment to her 
and the baby; his continued involvement with other women; the 
fact that he had previously fathered a baby out of wedlock and 
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consented to its adoption; her inability to support and rear the 
baby alone; the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby into 
a possible marriage with another man; and future visitation 
rights, and concluded that adoption would be in the baby's best 
interests. The counselor telephoned the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and determined that 
no claim of paternity had been registered for P.'s baby, P. 
then read the "Affidavit and Release" form with the counselor, 
stated that she understood its legal significance, and signed 
it, voluntarily transferring legal custody and control of the 
baby to LDS Social Services for adoption. Because of the 
lateness of the hour, the counselor permitted P. to take the 
baby home that night, and she returned the baby the next day. 
LDS Social Services placed the baby with its adoptive parents on 
June 12, 1987. (Slip Op., Add. 3-4; Paxman Aff't 1W 7-9, Add. 
34-35; Bowen Aff't, R. 101, Add. 37; I Tr. 13-15, 31-41; II Tr. 
2-4; Swayne Dep. 11-17; Findings U 9, Add. 19.) 
Plaintiff places great emphasis on events that occurred 
after P. relinquished legal custody of the baby to LDS Social 
Services. While those events are immaterial (Slip Op., Add. 
15), a response is required to correct the record. On Tuesday, 
June 9, before returning the baby to LDS Social Services that 
afternoon, P. took the baby to plaintiff's apartment for a short 
visit. While P. and the baby were there, one of plaintiff's 
other girlfriends also dropped in for a visit. Contrary to 
plaintiff's representation (Brief of Pet. at 3), there is no 
evidence in the record of any other visit of P. and the baby to 
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his apartment. (I Tr. 15, 42-43.) Plaintiff also claims that 
P. called him "repeatedly" from California and deceived him 
regarding the baby. (Brief of Pet. at 4.) The only calls were 
on Wednesday and Saturday, June 10 and 13. More importantly, 
the reason P. delayed telling plaintiff that she had 
relinquished the baby was that she feared he would be angry and 
do physical harm to her and her family. (Slip Op., Add. 4; I 
Tr. 15-16, 44-49.) 
After learning of the relinquishment, plaintiff 
registered a belated claim of paternity on June 15, 1987 and 
attempted to amend the birth certificate to add his name. 
However, plaintiff has testified that if he were to obtain 
custody of the child, he would give the child to his sister "to 
raise" until some indefinite time when he might become "more 
stable." (Slip Op., Add. 1, 11; I Tr. 17-18; Swayne Dep. 28-30; 
Findings 1[ 12, Add. 19.) 
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging two "causes of action." 
The first requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 
violation of federal constitutional rights under color of state 
law, and the second seeks a declaratory judgment that U.C.A. 
§ 78-30-4, facially and as applied, violates the equal 
protection and due process provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions. (R. 2-5, Add. 26-29.) 
The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a 
preliminary injunction, concluding that success on the merits 
was unlikely because, among other findings: 
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13. It was not impossible for plaintiff to have 
filed his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date 
the child was relinquished for adoption. 
14. Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not 
behave in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, 
committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent 
to keep and rear the child. [R. 70, Add. 19.] 
The district court subsequently granted defendants summary 
judgment, concluding that there was no "state action" to support 
the civil rights and constitutional claims, and that section 
78-30-4 is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied in 
this case. (R. 190-91, Add. 21-22.) 
As noted, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's motions 
for summary reversal and injunction pending appeal. (Add. 
23-24.) On the merits the Court of Appeals reversed the holding 
of no state action, but affirmed the constitutionality of the 
statute under the federal equal protection clause and the 
federal and state due process provisions. (Slip Op., Add. 1-16.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff abandoned the state action issue by failing to 
raise it in his Docketing Statement or opening brief to the 
Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in 
reviewing the state action ruling rendered by the district 
court. In any event, LDS Social Services did not engage in 
state action by accepting relinquishment of the child from the 
mother and placing the child with adoptive parents. The state 
was not significantly involved in the relinquishment and 
adoptive placement; LDS Social Services was not performing a 
traditional state function; and LDS Social Services did not 
"terminate" plaintiff's inchoate paternal rights. Therefore, 
the conduct of LDS Social Services was not "state action," and 
plaintiff accordingly has no basis to challenge the 
constitutionality of 78-30-4 as applied. 
Section 78-30-4 does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution by requiring the 
mother's consent for adoption of her illegitimate child while 
conditioning the father's right of consent on his timely 
registration of paternity. Inherent differences in the unwed 
parents' relative situations with respect to the newborn child 
justify significant variations in their respective parental 
rights and require a rule that gives the mother the exclusive 
right to consent to the child's adoption. The decisions of this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court hold that such a 
statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to achieve the state's 
compelling interest in prompt and final determinations regarding 
the care of illegitimate newborns. Paternal consent to the 
adoption of illegitimate newborns would undermine the public 
policy behind the statute by threatening the mother's right of 
privacy, complicating and delaying the adoption process, or 
deterring adoption altogether. Plaintiff assumed no 
responsibility for, and developed no relationship with, the 
child. Therefore, equal protection does not require that he be 
accorded rights similar to those of the mother. 
Section 78-30-4(3) operated consistent with the demands 
of due process because it adequately protected plaintiff's 
opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. Plaintiff 
had notice of the pregnancy, as well as of the time and place of 
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birth; therefore, he reasonably could have protected his rights 
through marriage or registration of paternity. Because 
plaintiff's relationship with the child was purely biological, 
due process does not require that he be afforded a 
pretermination hearing. 
Finally, plaintiff's argument that he adopted the child 
by acknowledgment was neither raised nor decided in the lower 
courts; therefore, the issue may not be raised in this Court. 
In any event, the facts in no way support adoption by 
acknowledgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Analysis of the state action and constitutional issues 
should be preceded by a review of the framework and operation of 
the challenged statute, U.C.A. § 78-30-4. (See Add. 46.) This 
statute governs the adoption of illegitimate children in Utah. 
Subsection (1) requires "the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to [the] child," unless the parent or 
parents have previously "released his or her or their control or 
custody of such child" to a licensed child placement agency. 
Subsection (3)(a) provides that "the father of an illegitimate 
child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child 
by registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the 
department of health, a notice of his claim of paternity . . . 
and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the 
best of his ability." Subsection (3)(b) states that the notice 
may be registered at any time prior to the birth, but must be 
registered prior to the date the child is relinquished to an 
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adoption agency or, in the case of a private adoption, before 
the filing of an adoption petition. Subsection (3)(c) makes 
clear that if the father timely registers his claim of 
paternity, his rights are fully protected and adoption of the 
child may not proceed without his consent. If the father fails 
to timely register his claim of paternity, the mother may 
relinquish the child for adoption without notice to or consent 
of the father, and the father is thereafter barred from 
asserting his paternity. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 
681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (explaining operation and 
reaffirming constitutionality of the statute). 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REACHING THE STATE 
ACTION ISSUE AND IN DECIDING THAT LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES ENGAGED IN STATE ACTION. 
A. Abandonment of State Action Issue 
Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of 
state law, as well as a declaration of state constitutional 
violations. (Complaint, R. 4-5, Add. 28-29.) Defendants 
asserted the defense that they are purely private, nonpublic 
entities whose actions do not constitute "state action" subject 
to challenge under the cited civil rights and constitutional 
provisions. (Answer U8, R. 27.) Both parties briefed the state 
action issue in the district court, which concluded there was no 
state action: 
The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute 
state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the due 
process and equal protection provisions of either the 
United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 
[Add. 22.] 
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Plaintiff's Docketing Statement did not identify state 
action as an issue on appeal, and his opening brief to the Court 
of Appeals failed to challenge or even mention the district 
court's holding of no state action. Accordingly, defendants 
argued in their response brief that plaintiff had abandoned the 
state action issue and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals 
could not alter the district court's ruling. (Resp. Br. to Ct. 
of App. at 10.) By ignoring that argument and addressing the 
state action issue after it had been abandoned by plaintiff, the 
Court of Appeals committed reversible error. See, e.g., 
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 
1983); Brubaker v. Branine, 237 Kan. 488, 701 P.2d 929, 931 
(1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 
974, 976 (Colo. App. 1984). 
B. Merits of State Action Issue 
It has been long settled that the due process and equal 
protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to 
"state action," not to acts of private persons or entities. 
Rende11-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). Likewise 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, applies only to deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights "under color of state law." Id. at 838. The statutory 
"under color of state law" requirement is construed as 
equivalent to the "state action" element of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, id. Thus, the sum test for relief under section 
1983 is as follows: 
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is 
subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed 
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in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the 
alleged infringement of federal rights "fairly 
attributable to the State?" [Id.] 
If the challenged action is not "state action," this Court need 
not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. Id. 
The corresponding state constitutional provisions are 
also limited in application to "state action." See Hulbert v. 
State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) ("these provisions were 
designed to protect the individual from state action"); Gray v. 
Department of Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 807, 816 (Utah 1984); 
see also Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial Comm'n, 
649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982) (construction of federal 
constitution persuasive in applying state constitution). 
In determining whether the action of a private entity is 
attributable to the state, courts look at the degree of state 
involvement in the challenged action. For example, in 
Rendell-Baker the U.S. Supreme Court held that a nonprofit, 
private school's discharge of certain employees did not 
constitute state action because the function performed was not 
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State," and 
there was no "symbiotic relationship" between the school and the 
state. 457 U.S. at 842. It did not matter that the school was 
regulated and largely funded by the state, id. at 840-41. 
Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Court 
held that a private nursing home's decision to transfer Medicaid 
patients to lower levels of care did not constitute state action 
because provision of nursing homes is not a traditional state 
function, and state regulation and review of the decision could 
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not be regarded as state approval of or participation in the 
transfer. Id. at 1005-11. See also Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 
F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1983) (conduct of LDS Social Services 
representatives does not constitute state action under section 
1983); Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital, 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (state must be involved in the activity that caused 
the alleged injury); Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 962-64 
(D. Utah 1980) (no state action by LDS Business College in 
dismissing teacher pursuant to statute permitting religious 
discrimination). 
In this case the Court of Appeals found state action by 
following the flawed analysis employed by the federal court in 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 
1987). (Slip Op., Add. 6.) To begin with, both courts relied 
on the two-step analysis set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), which focuses on whether the alleged 
deprivation was caused by the exercise of a state-created right, 
and on whether the defendant was a "state actor." Lugar held 
that a private creditor, acting with state officials pursuant to 
state garnishment and attachment laws, engaged in state action. 
That analysis, however, has no application to cases involving 
private entities engaged in traditionally private functions, 
without state assistance, as evidenced by the distinct analysis 
employed in Rendell-Baker and Blum, supra, which were decided 
the same day as Lugar. The Court of Appeals held that the Lugar 
test was satisfied because "the State was responsible for the 
statute," and LDS Social Services acted for the state "in 
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terminating appellant's parental rights." (Slip Op., Add. 
6-7.) That holding is contrary to both law and reason. 
As a different panel of the Court of Appeals held in 
Dirks v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 950-51 (Utah App. 1988), the 
fact that a procedural scheme is created by the state does not 
convert private parties who follow the scheme into "state 
machinery." Otherwise, "virtually all formal private 
arrangements" entered into pursuant to state law would be 
"subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. at 951, quoting Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 
578 P.2d 925, 932 (1978). A statutory enactment may serve as a 
basis for finding state action only when the enactment alters 
existing law so as to authorize previously unlawful action. See 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (California statute 
repealing prohibition of racial discrimination in housing). For 
example, in Larsen v. Kirkham, supra, dismissal of the teacher 
pursuant to the statute permitting religious discrimination did 
not constitute state action because the statute vested LDS 
Business College with no more freedom to discriminate than it 
possessed under common law. 499 F. Supp. at 964. 
Likewise, section 78-30-4 renders paternal rights of 
unwed fathers no more subject to termination than they were at 
common law. In fact, at common law "there was no legally 
recognized relationship between a putative father and his 
illegitimate child." Comment, "Delineation of the Boundaries of 
Putative Fathers1 Rights: A Psychological Parenthood 
Perspective," 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 290, 294-95 (1985). 
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Accordingly, the statute does not authorize anything that was 
previously impermissible; if anything, the statute accords unwed 
fathers more rights than before. LDS Social Services did 
nothing that it could not have done prior to the statute. Its 
right to accept custody of illegitimate children was not 
state-created, but has traditionally been a function of private 
entities; therefore, its exercise of that right cannot be 
regarded as state action. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that LDS Social Services 
"terminated" plaintiff's paternal rights is also in error. To 
begin with, as the court later noted, an unwed father does not 
have fully vested parental rights until he timely registers his 
acknowledgment of paternity. (Slip Op., Add. 12.) Until that 
time his rights remain "provisional," Wells, supra, at 206, or 
"inchoate," Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983). 
Moreover, the adoption agency does not "terminate" an unwed 
father's rights by accepting the relinquishment of his child; 
rather, the father himself forfeits, or "surrender[s] [those 
rights] pursuant to statute" by failing timely to register his 
claim of paternity. Wells, supra, at 202. The unwed father's 
rights are not formally terminated until entry of the adoption 
order. See U.C.A. §§ 78-30-9 and -11. In short, the adoption 
agency is not rendered a "state actor" by the forfeiture that 
results from the father's own inaction. 
Neither may support for the Court of Appeals' state 
action ruling be found in the precedents of this Court. If 
state action was "assumed" in the prior cases dealing with 
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78-30-4 (Slip Op., Add, 6), it was because the issue had not 
been raised by the parties, not because state action was 
present. As noted by the Court in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n.2 (Utah 1984), a private adoption 
agency1s conduct under 78-30-4 "does not constitute state 
action." See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 
695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Due process limits 
state action, not the actions of private parties."). Other 
jurisdictions also recognize that the actions of private persons 
involved in the adoption of an illegitimate infant are not 
subject to constitutional challenge by the unwed father. See, 
e.g., In re Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942, 
945-46 (1986) (mother's concealment of adoption did not 
constitute state action). 
Under proper state action analysis, as set forth in 
Rendell-Baker and Blum, LDS Social Services did not engage in 
state action because the state was not involved to a significant 
degree in the relinquishment and adoptive placement of P.'s 
baby. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, LDS Social Services 
receives no state funding, and its internal decisions regarding 
acceptance and placement of illegitimate infants is not subject 
to state control. (Slip Op., Add. 6; Brown Aff't, R. 94, Add. 
30.) Moreover, LDS Social Services was not performing a 
function that has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the State." Rendell-Baker, supra, at 842. While the 
termination of fully vested parental rights has traditionally 
been the function of the state, adoptive placement of 
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illegitimate infants, which may result in the forfeiture of 
inchoate paternal rights, has historically fallen to private 
agencies. See Presser, "The Historical Background of the 
American Law of Adoption," 11 J. Fam. L. 443 (1971). 
Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court of Appeals 
holding that plaintiff's alleged injury was the result of state 
action by LDS Social Services. Enforcement of the state action 
doctrine in this case would put an end to the case-by-case 
scrutiny of private actions taken during the adoption process, 
of which the Court forewarned in Sanchez, supra, at 755, and 
properly limit the Court's inquiry to the facial 
constitutionality of the statute and private parties' compliance 
with the statute. 
POINT II: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF UNWED MOTHERS AND 
FATHERS IN U.C.A. § 78-30-4 IS VALID UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiff argues that 78-30-4 violates the federal equal 
protection provision by granting the mother of an illegitimate 
child the right to consent to the child's adoption, while 
according the child's father the same right only if he timely 
registers an acknowledgment of paternity. He asserts that while 
the objective of the statute is valid, its gender-based 
distinction does not further that purpose, and actually defeats 
its purpose by protecting "unwilling," "irresponsible" mothers 
and excluding "willing," "responsible" fathers. (Brief of Pet. 
at 6-10.) Plaintiff's equal protection argument must be 
rejected on the grounds that: (1) mothers and fathers of 
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illegitimate infants are not similarly situated with respect to 
the child; (2) controlling precedents hold that the differences 
between unwed parents of newborns justify the statutory 
distinction; (3) public policies and privacy interests 
underlying the statute require the distinction; and (4) there 
is no evidence that plaintiff falls into the class of "willing 
and responsible" fathers. 
A. Basis For Different Treatment of Unwed Mothers And Fathers 
Equal protection embodies the general principle that 
"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if 
their circumstances were the same." Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 669 (Utah 1984); see also Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 
243 (Utah 1979). When men and women are not in fact similarly 
situated in the area covered by the legislation in question, 
distinct statutory treatment does not violate equal protection. 
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) 
(upholding gender distinctions in military promotion system 
because male and female officers are not similarly situated with 
respect to service opportunities). A long line of federal and 
Utah cases demonstrates that the unwed mother and father of a 
newborn child are not similarly situated with respect to the 
child and that they, therefore, may be accorded different legal 
rights. 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), relied upon by 
plaintiff, did not involve the adoption of an illegitimate 
newborn. Caban held that a statute permitting illegitimate 
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children to be adopted with the consent of the unwed mother 
alone, without according the same right of consent to the unwed 
father, violated equal protection as applied to the father of 
older children with whom he had developed a substantial 
relationship. There, the parents lived together for five years 
and held themselves out as husband and wife; the father was 
listed on the children's birth certificates; he lived with the 
children as their father for four years; he contributed to the 
care and support of the family; and he visited and communicated 
with the children even after separating from their mother. Id. 
at 382. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the 
father's relationship with the children was just as substantial 
as the mother's and that the purpose of the statute was 
therefore not served by denying the father a voice in the 
adoption. Id. at 393-94. 
However, the Caban Court emphasized that the statute's 
different treatment of unwed fathers and mothers would be 
justified in the case of a newborn illegitimate child because, 
while the mother has a substantial relationship with the child, 
the father does not. Legislative distinctions based on the 
differences in their respective relationships with the child are 
acceptable. See id. at 389. As the Caban Court observed: 
Even if the special difficulties attendant upon locating 
and identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a 
legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of 
newborns, these difficulties need not persist past 
infancy. . . . In those cases where the father never has 
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, 
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the 
State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing 
the adoption of that child. fId. at 392, emp. added.] 
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Other members of the Court in Caban echoed the view that 
the unwed mother and father of illegitimate newborns are not 
similarly situated with respect to the child: 
With respect to a large group of adoptions—those of 
newborn children and infants--unwed mothers and unwed 
fathers are simply not similarly situated . . . . Our 
law has given the unwed mother the custody of her 
illegitimate children precisely because it is she who 
bears the child and because the vast majority of unwed 
fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply 
uninterested. This custodial preference has carried with 
it a correlative power in the mother to place her child 
for adoption or not to do so. 
. . . These common and statutory rules of law reflect 
the physical reality that only the mother carries and 
gives birth to the child, as well as the undeniable 
social reality that the unwed mother is always an 
identifiable parent and the custodian of the child—until 
or unless the State intervenes. The biological father, 
unless he has established a familial tie with the child 
by marrying the mother, is often a total stranger from 
the State's point of view. I do not understand the Court 
to question these pragmatic differences. See ante, 392, 
60 L Ed 2d, at 307. An unwed father who has not come 
forward and who has established no relationship with the 
child is plainly not in a situation similar to the 
mother1s. [Id. at 398-99, Stewart, J., dissenting, 
citations omitted, emp. added.] 
Justice Stevens, joined by two other members of the 
Court, observed: 
Men and women are different, and the difference is 
relevant to the question whether the mother may be given 
the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child 
born out of wedlock. . . . 
These differences continue at birth and immediately 
thereafter. During that period, the mother and child are 
together; the mother's identity is known with certainty. 
The father, on the other hand, may or may not be present; 
his identity may be unknown to the world and may even be 
uncertain to the mother. These natural differences 
between unmarried fathers and mothers make it probable 
that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will 
have custody of the newborn infant. 
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B. Controlling Decisions Upholding Statutory Distinction 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), rejected the 
equal protection argument raised by plaintiff in this case on 
facts very similar to the present case. There, the putative 
father of an illegitimate child lived with the mother before the 
baby's birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital at 
the time of birth. However, he did not place his name on the 
baby's birth certificate; he did not live with the mother and 
baby after the birth; he did not offer to marry the mother; and 
he provided no financial support to the mother and baby. Id. at 
252. Two years later the mother and her husband filed an 
(footnote continued) 
. . . [A]s a matter of equal protection analysis, it 
is perfectly obvious that at the time and immediately 
after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between 
men and women justify some differential treatment of the 
mother and father in the adoption process. 
Most particularly, these differences justify a rule 
that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive 
right to consent to its adoption. Such a rule gives the 
mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed 
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to 
care for the child. It also gives the loving father an 
incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact 
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the 
interests of the adoptive parents, the child, and the 
public at large by streamlining the often traumatic 
adoption process and allowing the prompt, complete, and 
reliable integration of the child into a satisfactory new 
home at as young an age as is feasible. . . . 
With this much the Court does not disagree; it 
confines its holding to cases such as the one at hand 
involving the adoption of an older child against the 
wishes of a natural father who previously has 
participated in the rearing of the child and who admits 
paternity. Ante, at 392-393, 60 L Ed 2d, at 307-308. 
[Id. at 404-08, Stevens, J., dissenting, footnotes and 
citations omitted, emp. added.] 
-22-
adoption petition without notice to the father, and one month 
after that the father filed a paternity petition in a different 
county. The adoption order was entered pursuant to state law, 
without notice to or consent of the father, even though the 
judge was aware of the father's paternity petition then pending 
in a different court. The father thereafter challenged the 
constitutionality of the state law which allowed adoption of 
illegitimate children with the consent of the mother alone, 
unless the father acquired a consent right by registering a 
timely claim of paternity. Ld. at 251-53. 
The Lehr Court rejected the father's claim that the state 
law violated equal protection by according greater rights to 
unwed mothers than to unwed fathers. The Court emphasized that 
"the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the 
responsibilities they have assumed." Jd. at 257. The Court 
then adopted the view of the four dissenting Justices in Caban 
"identify!ing] the clear distinction between a mere biological 
relationship and an actual relationship of parental 
responsibility." Id. at 259-60. The Court concluded that 
because the father had never established a "substantial 
relationship" with his illegitimate child, the statute did not 
operate to deny equal protection: 
Whereas [the mother] had a continuous custodial 
responsibility for [the child], [the father] never 
established any custodial, personal, or financial 
relationship with her. If one parent has an established 
custodial relationship with the child and the other 
parent has either abandoned or never established a 
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prevent a State from according the two parents different 
legal rights. 
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Id. at 267-68, emp. added. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (rejecting unwed father's equal protection 
claim vis-a-vis married fathers because the unwed father had 
"never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to 
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child"). 
This Court has previously upheld section 78-30-4 on 
similar grounds under the state and federal equal protection 
provisions. In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 
1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed father, who had developed no 
relationship with his illegitimate child, relied on Caban to 
challenge the statute's unequal treatment of unwed mothers and 
fathers. The Court easily distinguished Caban on the basis that 
the father there had developed a substantial relationship with 
his children over a number of years. The Court noted that Utah 
law protects such fathers by recognizing their adoption of 
children by acknowledgment pursuant to section 78-30-12, without 
registration of paternity. However, the Ellis Court concluded 
that where the unwed father has developed no such relationship, 
equal protection does not require that he be accorded an 
adoption veto power equal to the mother's. 615 P.2d at 1255. 
Plaintiff criticizes Ellis, asserting that it requires an 
unwed father to register his paternity pursuant to 78-30-4 as a 
condition of adoption by acknowledgment pursuant to 78-30-12. 
(Brief of Pet. at 16-17.) This argument misconstrues Ellis. 
The Ellis Court correctly characterized 78-30-12 as a separate, 
alternative means of perfecting paternal rights. 615 P.2d at 
1255. The Court did not state that registration of paternity is 
necessary for adoption by acknowledgment; indeed, 78-30-12 
expressly states that "[t]he foregoing provisions of this 
chapter do not apply to such an adoption." (Add. 46.) Ellis 
merely states the obvious, that if an unwed father fails timely 
to register his paternity, he risks losing his rights before 
adoption by acknowledgment is accomplished. 615 P.2d at 1254. 
Moreover, In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988), 
emphatically does not "modify" Ellis, as claimed by plaintiff. 
(Brief of Pet. at 17.) T.R.F. expressly states that Ellis 
cannot be read to "graft" the registration requirement onto the 
acknowledgment statute, 760 P.2d at 910-11, and concludes that 
the unwed father had accomplished adoption by acknowledgment 
without timely registration of paternity, ]Ld. at 912. 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its equal protection 
holding in Ellis: 
Implicit in that decision was the holding that there are 
reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute 
(between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers 
who file and fathers who do not) and that these 
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a 
proper government objective. [Id. at 204.] 
However, the Wells Court went beyond Ellis in identifying the 
putative father's rights, the state's interest in the adoption 
process, and the justification for according unwed mothers and 
fathers different rights. 
The Wells Court recognized that "an unwed father's right 
to his relationship with his newborn is a provisional right by 
comparison with the vested right of a parent who has fulfilled a 
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parental role over a considerable period of time." Id. at 206, 
emp. add. The Court explained that the father's right can be 
forfeited pursuant to 78-30-4: 
Although parental rights have their origin in 
biological relationships, those relationships do not 
guarantee the permanency of parental rights. 
Constitutionally protected parental rights can be lost. 
They can be surrendered pursuant to statute. [Ld. at 202.] 
Regarding the state's interest in the adoption of 
illegitimate newborns, the Court stated: 
There are special problems in defining parental 
rights over newborns who are illegitimate. The identity 
of the father may be unknown. The mother may desire to 
give the child up for adoption. The state has a strong 
interest in speedily identifying those persons who will 
assume the parental role over such children, not just to 
assure immediate and continued physical care but also to 
facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to 
its parents. The state must therefore have legal means 
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether 
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to 
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their 
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive 
parents must be substituted. [Ld. at 203.] 
The Court concluded that this "strong interest in immediate and 
secure adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient 
justification for significant variations in the parental rights 
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are not 
automatically identified by virtue of their role in the process 
of birth." M. See also Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services, 
222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to similar statute). 
In summary, the profound differences between the 
situations of the unwed mother and father with respect to their 
newborn child justify and require "significant variations" in 
their respective parental rights. It is the mother who has the 
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exclusive right to decide whether to bear the child or not. See 
U.C.A. § 78-14-5(4)(f); cf. §§ 76-7-302 to -305; see also 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) 
(invalidating spousal consent requirement for abortion); Doe v. 
Rampton. 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (invalidating Utah 
spousal consent requirement); Comment, "Husband Notification for 
Abortion in Utah: A Patronizing Problem," 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
609, 613-15. Her constitutional right of privacy allows her to 
withhold the fact of pregnancy, as well as the father's 
identity, from other persons. Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 264; 
Caban, supra. 441 U.S. at 404-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Wells, supra. 681 P.2d at 207; B.J.R.L. v. State of Utah. 655 F. 
Supp. 692, 697-99 (D. Utah 1987) (discussing privacy rights of 
unwed mother and child in support context); In re Karen A.B.. 
513 A.2d 770, 772 (Del. 1986) (mother's privacy interest in 
being free from harassment by unwed father); Barron, "Notice to 
the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights," 9 Fam. 
L.Q. 527, 540-42 (1975); Poulin, "Illegitimacy and Family 
Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation In Paternity Suits," 70 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 910, 922-24 (1976). The mother has the right to 
marry another man before the child is born, making it the 
legitimate child of her husband "for all purposes." See U.C.A. 
§ 30-1-17.2; In re J.S.V.. 402 Mass. 571, 524 N.E.2d 826 (1988) 
(putative father of child born to married woman has no right to 
notice of adoption). It is the mother who bears and nourishes 
the child throughout the pregnancy; it is she who is constantly 
faced with decisions about how best to care for the child; it is 
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she whose health is threatened and whose freedoms and activities 
are restricted by the pregnancy and birth. She is automatically 
identified as the mother by her role in the birth process, and 
consequently will have custody of and responsibility for the 
newborn infant. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 
1059, 1068-69 (Okla. 1985) (rejecting unwed father's equal 
protection challenge to similar adoption statute); Wells, supra, 
681 P.2d at 203; Caban, supra, at 405 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). In short, the unwed mother has a substantial 
relationship with the child from the moment of birth. See 
Poulin, supra, at 916. 
By contrast, the unwed father's relsttionship with his 
child at birth is purely biological. He may or may not be 
present; his location and identity may be unknown, even to the 
mother; and even if known, he may be unwilling to assume the 
full responsibilities of parenthood. Wells, supra, at 203; 
Lehr, supra, at 260-61 ("Parental rights do not spring 
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and 
child. They require relationships more enduring."). 
Plaintiff concedes that 78-30-4 is valid with respect to 
unwed fathers whose identity and location are unknown, but 
argues that it is unconstitutional as applied to "identified, 
present and willing fathers." (Brief of Pet. at 10.) This 
argument overlooks the major purpose of the registration 
statute, which is to determine promptly and conclusively whether 
the unwed father is committed to support his child and to assume 
full legal responsibility for the lifetime care of the child. 
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This determination is just as important with respect to known 
and present unwed fathers as it is for absent and unknown 
fathers. As illustrated by the facts in Lehr and Sanchez, a 
father who is known and present but who has failed to 
demonstrate his legal commitment is of no more benefit to the 
child than a father whose identity and location are unknown. 
The state cannot merely assume that a known and present unwed 
father will undertake full parental responsibility for the 
child. In the absence of a legal tie between the father and 
child, the state needs some way to ascertain promptly and 
conclusively whether the father will assume full parental 
responsibility. The registration requirement achieves that 
statutory objective by allowing unwed fathers to fill the gap of 
legal commitment left open by the absence of marriage. 
C. Policy And Privacy Reasons For Statutory Distinction 
Plaintiff's argument seems to suggest that 78-30-4 is 
deficient in not requiring every known unwed father to be 
contacted personally, before the adoptive placement, to 
ascertain his interest in custody or to obtain his consent for 
the adoption. However, as discussed under due process, infra, 
"[The Constitution] does not require that the father of an 
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before 
his parental right can be terminated." Wells, supra, 681 P.2d 
at 207. A paternal consent requirement would also be contrary 
to the public policies and privacy interests underlying the 
statute. As stated in Caban: 
If the State were to require the consent of both parents, 
or some kind of hearing to explain why either1s consent 
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is unnecessary or unobtainable, it would unquestionably 
complicate and delay the adoption process. [441 U.S. at 
407-08, Stevens, J., dissenting.] 
Delay of the adoption undermines the entire statutory scheme by 
lessening the chances of adoption and depriving the child of 
early and uninterrupted bonding to its parents. Lehr, supra, 
463 U.S. at 264-65; Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's 
Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982); Wells, supra, at 
203. 3 
Requiring the unwed father's consent to the adoption 
threatens the mother's right of privacy, as discussed above, by 
inducing unwanted disclosure of the pregnancy and the parents' 
identities and by restricting the mother's freedom of choice 
with regard to the baby. To avoid disclosure and conflict, many 
mothers would simply withhold their child from adoption, against 
their best judgment, thus foreclosing the child's opportunity 
for a better life, as well as reducing the number of children 
As one scholar has noted: 
[T]hose concerned about the welfare of an illegitimate 
infant cannot keep the child indefinitely in limbo, 
waiting to see what "functional equivalents" of marriage 
the father will demonstrate if he is given plenty of 
time. It is not difficult to sense the risks to a child 
in such circumstances, knowing as we do how much every 
child needs a sense of continuity and stability in the 
child-parent relationship. Quilloin's waiting child is a 
vivid symbol of the way all persons wait in a 
noncommittal relationship, whether child or adult, at 
risk in a sea of uncertain expectations. 
Hafen, "The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and 
Sexual Privacy--Balancing the Individual and Social Interests," 
81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 498-99 (1983). 
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available to increasing numbers of infertile couples desiring to 
adopt. Other unwed mother's facing a father s veto of the 
adoption will turn to other alternatives. They may either 
withhold the father's identity, falsely declare the father to be 
"unknown," use another person to pose as a consenting father, or 
resort to independent or black market adoptions in which the 
legal requirements may be more easily circumvented. See Note, 
"The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to Notice and a 
Hearing," 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081, 1093-94 n.47; In re Adoption 
of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 490 (1975) 
(grant of adoption veto power to unwed fathers "will provide a 
very fertile field for extortion"). More unwed mothers would 
also turn to abortion, which has been identified as the number 
one barrier to adoption. America's Waiting Children, supra, 
National Committee For Adoption, Adoption 
Factbook—United States Data, Issues, Regulations and Resources 
12, 18, 55-63 (Washington, D.C. 1985) (hereafter "Adoption 
Factbook"); Office of Population Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Health 
and Human Services, The Adoption Option: A Guidebook For 
Pregnancy Counselors 13-15 (1987). Requiring notice to or 
consent of unwed fathers has been identified as an unnecessary 
barrier to adoption: 
The father of the baby may delay or cause an adoption 
plan to be cancelled, even when he does not intend to 
raise the baby himself or has provided no financial or 
emotional support before or after the baby's birth. 
Interagency Task Force on Adoption, America's Waiting Children: 
A Report to the President 9, 20, 33 (Washington, D.C, March 
1988) (hereafter "America's Waiting Children"). See also In re 
T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980) (recognition of consent 
right in unwed father "would give him a powerful club with which 
he could substantially reduce the options available to the 
unmarried mother"). 
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at 17 (nearly one-third of the one-and-a-half million abortions 
in 1982 involved teenage mothers); Adoption Factbook, supra, at 
18. When adoption could provide a positive solution that meets 
the needs of all parties, the result may instead be coerced 
abortion to avoid the stresses and stigma of unwed motherhood 
identified in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
In addition, the delay and uncertainty associated with a 
paternal consent requirement would cause lasting psychological 
and emotional injury to the child and adoptive parents. Crucial 
bonding with adoptive parents would be either totally lost, if 
the child is in foster care, or weakened by the adoptive 
parents' uncertainty regarding the permanence of the placement. 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, Beyond The Best Interests of The 
Child 22 (The Free Press, 1979). The child "feelfs] the 
impermanency and insecurity of the arrangement which clashes 
with his need for emotional constancy." Ld. at 25. 
Accordingly, "to avoid irreparable psychological injury, 
placement, whenever in dispute, must be treated as the emergency 
that it is for the child." Ld. at 43. Placements must also be 
final and irrevocable if adoptive parents are to rely on the 
adoption process. Wells, supra, at 206-07. 
D. Plaintiff Was Not A "Willing" Father 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the statute operated 
unconstitutionally in this case by identifying him as 
"unwilling," while identifying P. as "willing," to assume 
parental responsibilities. (Brief of Pet. at 8-12.) This 
argument misconstrues the statute and the facts. The mother's 
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position with regard to the illegitimate infant is determined by 
whether she relinquishes custody to an agency or other person 
for adoption. If she retains custody, her continuing commitment 
to the child is manifest and no registration of that fact is 
necessary. By relinquishing the child for adoption, a mother 
does not evidence "unwillingness" or "irresponsibility" (Brief 
of Pet. at 8), but rather demonstrates a mature love and concern 
for the child's best interests and lifetime care. 
As for plaintiff, while he was present in the hospital at 
the time of the child's birth, he failed to demonstrate his 
claimed willingness to assume the responsibilities of 
fatherhood. For several months prior to the birth he denied the 
baby was; he did not sign the birth certificate; he did not pay 
the hospital expenses or subsequent support; he failed to timely 
register his paternity; he never offered to marry P.; and he had 
no intention of living with and supporting her and the baby. To 
the contrary, he continued dating and engaging in sexual 
relations with other girls. He merely assumed that P. would 
keep the baby, allowing him to visit periodically at his 
convenience. Plaintiff's visits to the hospital were equally as 
likely for the purpose of maintaining a relationship with P. as 
for developing a relationship with the baby. The subsequent 
visit at his apartment was initiated by P., not by plaintiff. 
And the baby shower was given by the family, not by plaintiff. 
Even now, it is only his sister who wants the baby, not 
plaintiff. This is the only case of which defendants are aware 
in which the putative father seeks to upset an adoption, not to 
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establish his own relationship with the child, but to allow 
someone else that opportunity. In short, plaintiff does not 
fall within the class of "identified" and "willing" fathers, as 
claimed, and therefore lacks standing to assert discrimination 
against that class. See, e.g., County Court of Ulster County v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979). 
In conclusion, plaintiff's equal protection rights were 
not violated by operation of section 78-30-4. As the Court of 
Appeals concluded: 
[Because plaintiff] failed to communicate concern for and 
interest in the child apart from his few visits with her 
..., it is not unjust for him to be classified with other 
similarly situated unwed fathers who have lost their 
parental rights by not coming forward to acknowledge 
their parental responsibilities. [Slip Op., Add. 11.] 
The statute accurately identified both plaintiff and P. as unwed 
parents who, for whatever reasons, preferred to allow their baby 
to be reared by someone else. The statute's objective was met 
in promptly placing the baby with loving, caring adoptive 
parents. There is no basis under equal protection to disturb 
5 
that adoptive placement. 
Plaintiff asserts in Point II of his Brief that 
78-30-4 violates the equal protection provision of the Utah 
Constitution. (Brief of Pet. at 21-23.) However, plaintiff 
presented no separate state equal protection argument in the 
Court of Appeals, and that court rendered no ruling on the 
issue. (Slip. Op., Add. 11, citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988).) Accordingly, plaintiff may not 
raise the separate state constitutional argument for the first 
time in this review by writ of certiorari. See, e.g., New 
Mexico Livestock Bd. v. Dose, 94 N.M. 68, 607 P.2d 606, 608-09 
(1980). 
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POINT III: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT U.C.A. 
§ 78-30-4(3) ADEQUATELY PROTECTED PLAINTIFF'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Plaintiff concedes the facial validity of 78-30-4(3) 
(Brief of Pet. at 24), but then asserts what amounts to a facial 
attack on the procedural aspects of the statute. (See Slip Op., 
Add. 12.) Plaintiff argues that the statute violates due 
process, not by denying notice of the relinquishment or 
adoption, but by denying the unwed father a hearing in which to 
prove that he has not abandoned his child. This denial of a 
hearing, plaintiff asserts, results in inadequate protection of 
his "opportunity interest" in forming a relationship with the 
child. (Brief of Pet. at 27, 31-32, 34.) These arguments have 
been squarely rejected by both this Court and the United States 
Supreme Court. 
To begin with, plaintiff attaches undue emphasis to the 
term "abandonment" in 78-30-4(3)(c). The operative language is 
the remainder of the same sentence providing that failure to 
register paternity constitutes a "surrender" of any right to 
notice and a hearing or of consent to the adoption. In Ellis v. 
Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed 
father asserted the same argument as that raised in the 
As in the Court of Appeals, plaintiff nominally relies 
on both federal and state due process provisions, while offering 
no distinct briefing or analysis for either provision. 
Following the rule set out in State v. Lafferty, supra, 
defendants focus their response on federal due process 
considerations. 
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present case, challenging "the constitutionality of the 
presumption that a father has abandoned his illegitimate child 
where he does not file a timely notice of paternity with the 
Bureau." _Id. at 1255. The Court characterized the argument as 
claiming denial of procedural due process and upheld the 
procedural features of the statute. Id. The Court noted that 
the statute may violate due process as applied only if the 
father did not have notice of the time and place of the birth, 
thus making it "impossible for the father to file the required 
notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault 
of his own." Jd. at 1256. Since the mother in Ellis came to 
Utah from out-of-state and gave birth to the child without the 
father's knowledge, the Court remanded for a determination of 
whether the father reasonably could have known when and where 
his child was born and could thus have protected his rights 
through a timely registration of paternity. Id. 
In two subsequent decisions this Court reaffirmed the 
facial validity of 78-30-4(3) and applied the Ellis 
"impossibility" standard to uphold the statute as applied. In 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the 
unwed mother traveled to a distant city within the state to 
deliver the baby and relinquish it for adoption. Throughout the 
pregnancy the father had been "equivocal, never indicating 
positively whether or not he desired to assert his paternal 
rights." Id. at 202. While the father knew of the possibility 
of adoption, he did not mail his claim of paternity until the 
day of the birth, and consequently it was not received by state 
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officials until one day after the relinquishment. The Court 
held that the registration was too late and that the statutory 
termination of the father's rights was valid under the state and 
federal due process provisions. 
In upholding the facial validity of the statute, the 
Wells Court expressly held that an unwed father's right to a 
relationship with his newborn child is merely "provisional," not 
vested, and that it "can be surrendered pursuant to statute," 
without a showing of unfitness or abandonment. Ld. at 202, 
206. The Court recognized the state's "compelling interest in 
speedily identifying those persons who will assume a parental 
role over newborn illegitimate children." Id- a t 206. The 
Court observed: 
Speedy identification is important to immediate and 
continued physical care and it is essential to early and 
uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If 
infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being 
torn from parents with whom they have begun the process 
of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the 
process in making themselves available for adoptions, 
such determinations must also be final and irrevocable, 
lid. at 206-07.] 
The Court held that 78-30-4(3) "is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the purposes identified above," id. at 207, concluding: 
No infringement of the unwed father's rights not 
essential to the statute's purposes has been identified. 
Due process does not require that the father of an 
illegitimate child be identified and personally notified 
before his parental right can be terminated. [Id.] 
For a discussion of the bonding process and the 
serious detrimental impact that disruption of the process causes 
the child and its adoptive family, see Goldstein, Beyond The 
Best Interests of The Child pp. 32-37 (The Free Press, 1973). 
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The Wells Court also upheld the statute as applied, 
noting that the birth occurred in the same state as the father's 
residence; the father knew of the time of birth and the 
possibility of adoption; and he failed adecjuately to communicate 
an intent to assert his parental rights. Accordingly, it was 
not "impossible" for the father to timely register his 
paternity. Id. at 207-08. 
In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 
1984), this Court again upheld application of 78-30-4(3), on 
facts much more favorable to the father than those in the 
present case. There, the couple lived together; the unwed 
father knew of the pregnancy; he knew the time and place of 
birth; he visited the mother and baby in the hospital; he 
proposed marriage; and he also expressed his desire for the 
mother and baby to live with him. The mother discussed possible 
adoption with the father, and he attempted to sign the birth 
certificate and register his paternity, but was prohibited from 
registering until after the baby had been relinquished. The 
Court concluded that since the father knew of the time and place 
of birth "and was presumed to know the law," his late 
registration was ineffective. _Id. at 755. The Court reasoned: 
It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came 
close to complying with the statute. Because of the 
nature of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a 
firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential. 
. . . [T]he degree of the father's diligence and 
sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights . . 
. [is] foreign to the statutory provisions. [Id.] 
Most recently, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 
P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), the Court held that application of the 
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statute violated due process, but on facts clearly 
distinguishable from those of the present case. There, the 
unwed parents lived together for over three years; the mother 
moved to Utah from out-of-state to have the baby; the mother 
told the father she and the baby would live with him; the couple 
planned to marry; and the father was in Arizona locating a home 
for the family when the baby was born prematurely. Li. at 687. 
On those facts the Court held that the father could not 
reasonably have complied with the registration requirement and 
that his late registration should be honored. Id. at 691. 
However, the Court reaffirmed that due process does not require 
actual notice of a proposed adoption "where the father knows or 
should know of the birth and can reasonably take the timely 
p 
action required to avoid the statutory bar." Id. 
The facts of the present case align much more closely 
with Wells and Sanchez than with Ellis and Baby Boy Doe. 
Plaintiff learned of the pregnancy in October of 1986 and had 
from then until the relinquishment on June 8, 1987 to register 
his claim of paternity. Unlike the fathers in Ellis and Baby 
Boy Doe, plaintiff was a Utah resident, was presumed to know 
Utah law, and had full knowledge of the time and place of 
birth. Like the father in Wells, plaintiff was "equivocal" 
The Court of Appeals decision in In re K.B.E., 740 
P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987), adds nothing to the law as set forth 
in the foregoing decisions of this Court. That case holds 
simply that where the mother does not intend to relinquish the 
baby for adoption, but races to the court with a petition merely 
to cut off the father's rights, the father's acknowledgment 
filed within hours after the birth is valid. 
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about asserting his paternal rights. See 681 P.2d at 202. 
Plaintiff had consented to a prior adoption; he knew of the 
possibility of this adoption; yet he refused to sign the birth 
certificate; he paid none of the hospital expenses; there were 
no plans to marry or live together; there was no offer of 
support; and he continued dating other girls as before. As P. 
testified, it was plaintiff's demonstrated lack of commitment to 
her and the baby that caused her to relinquish the baby for 
adoption. (I Tr. 38.) Like the father in Sanchez, plaintiff 
saw the mother and baby after the birth and "assumed" P. would 
keep the baby, see 680 P.2d at 755, but he developed no 
relationship with the baby and demonstrated no interest in 
asserting his paternal rights until after the baby was 
relinquished. And the most telling fact of all is that 
plaintiff does not now desire to establish a personal 
relationship with the child. Thus, plaintiff's statutory 
forfeiture of his paternal rights does not offend principles of 
g fairness inherent in due process. 
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he saw the baby 
"daily" prior to relinquishment and that his family also visited 
the baby. (Brief of Pet. at 28.) Those assertions are 
unsupported in the record. Between Saturday June 6 when P. left 
the hospital and Tuesday June 9 when P. physically delivered the 
baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff saw the baby only once, 
and that was after the relinquishment, at plaintiff's apartment, 
while one of his other girlfriends was present. (See Statement 
of Facts, supra, pp. 6-7.) 
Even if a showing of abandonment were required, the facts 
of this case would support a conclusion of prenatal 
abandonment. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So.2d 1312, 
1316-17 (Miss. 1982); State v. Lutheran Social Services, 227 
N.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Wis. 1975). 
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That conclusion is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's due process holding in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248 (1983). (The facts of Lehr were outlined above in 
connection with its equal protection analysis.) The father 
there raised the same argument as plaintiff does here, that a 
statute requiring timely registration of an unwed father's 
paternity does not adequately protect the father's right to 
demonstrate or develop a relationship with his child. The Court 
distinguished Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), relied 
upon by plaintiff here, on the basis that it involved 
termination of a fully "developed parent-child relationship," 
whereas the father in Lehr had no such relationship. 463 U.S. 
at 261. The Court explained: 
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward 
to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest 
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial 
protection under the Due Process Clause. . . . But the 
mere existence of a biological link does not merit 
equivalent constitutional protection. [Id.] 
The "biological connection," noted the Court, offers the father 
"an opportunity" to develop a relationship with the child, but 
if he fails to "grasp" that opportunity, due process does not 
require his input or consent regarding the child's adoption. 
Id. at 262. The Court concluded that the father's "opportunity 
interest" was adequately protected by the state's marriage law 
and putative father registration statute. Id. at 263. Such a 
statutory scheme might be "procedurally inadequate" only if it 
"were likely to omit many responsible fathers and if 
qualification for notice were beyond the control of an 
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interested putative father." id. at 264. However, as with 
78-30-4(3), "the right to receive notice [of an impending 
adoption] was completely within [the father's] control. . . . 
The possibility that he may have failed to [register his claim 
of paternity] because of his ignorance of the law cannot be 
sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself." Jtd. at 
263-64. The Court added that "legitimate state interests in 
facilitating the adoption of young children and having the 
adoption proceeding completed expeditiously . . . justify a 
trial judge's determination to require all interested parties to 
adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the 
statute." Id. at 265. n 
Based on the controlling decisions above, the Court of 
Appeals correctly concluded that plaintiff did not have full 
parental rights to abandon. (Slip Op., Add. 12.) What he 
The Court accepted the Legislature's judgment that "a 
more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the 
adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed 
mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair 
the desired finality of adoption decrees." Ld. at 264. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Lehr on the grounds 
that it involved a step-parent adoption and "deals with a wholly 
different statute." (Brief of Pet. at 36-37.) However, the 
Court attached no significance to the fact that a stepfather was 
involved; the focus was still on the biological father's failure 
to protect his paternal right. As for the statute involved, 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) is more favorable to unwed fathers than the 
statute upheld in Lehr because the Utah law gives registered 
fathers an absolute veto power over any adoption, whereas the 
New York law allowed registered fathers merely to present 
evidence "relevant to the best interests of the child." See 
Lehr, supra, at 251 n.5. 
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abandoned or forfeited was the opportunity to develop a 
substantial parent-child relationship• That "opportunity 
interest" was adequately protected by the state's marriage law 
and the registration statute. Lehr, supra; Sanchez, supra, 680 
P.2d at 755-56, See also In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 
606, 609 (Ark. 1988) (full parental rights do not attach to 
unwed father of newborn); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 
462 (Ga. 1987) (opportunity interest of unwed father may be 
abandoned if not timely pursued); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214, 
216-17 (Ind. App. 1987) (not unreasonable to require unwed 
father to take timely action to protect his opportunity 
interest); In re Petition of Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 945 
(Idaho 1986) (unwed father's opportunity for parent-child 
relationship is "fleeting" and will be lost if not quickly 
"grasped"). 
In summary, plaintiff's argument for an abandonment or 
fitness hearing must be rejected for the reason that he did not 
hold fully developed parental rights. The cases cited by 
plaintiff in support of a hearing are clearly inapplicable 
because they all deal with termination of fully vested parental 
rights. (Brief of Pet. at 29-33.) Plaintiff's biological 
relationship "does not merit equivalent constitutional 
protection." Lehr, supra, at 261. See also Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978) (holding that parental 
rights of unwed father whose relationship with child was purely 
biological could be terminated without fitness hearing); In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1067-68 (Okla. 1985) (due 
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process does not require that unwed father be accorded notice 
and hearing). Under 78-30-4(3) plaintiff could have guaranteed 
a right to a hearing by timely registering his paternity. 
Moreover, as the statute is construed by this Court, even a 
father who registers late may file an action to show that it was 
impossible for him to register timely, through no fault of his 
own. Ellis, supra, at 1256. If impossibility is established, 
the father is then entitled "to show that he was not afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute." Id.; see 
Wells, supra, at 208. Thus, the statute is not likely to omit 
many responsible fathers. See Lehr, supra. In fact, plaintiff 
has been afforded several hearings in this case. All told, 
seven different judges in three different courts have examined 
the merits of this case and have concluded that plaintiff's due 
process rights were adequately protected. As the Court of 
Appeals concluded, plaintiff "had every reasonable opportunity 
to register" his claim of paternity before the infant was 
relinquished for adoption. (Slip Op., Add. 15.) Therefore, his 
due process claim must be denied. 
POINT IV: PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF 
ADOPTION BY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 
THIS COURT. 
Plaintiff asserts in his final argument that he adopted 
P.fs baby by acknowledgment pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-12 before 
the infant was relinquished for adoption. (Brief of Pet. at 
42.) However, that argument is raised for the first time in 
this Court. Plaintiff's Complaint makes no such claim (Add. 
26-29), and the district court issued no ruling on the issue 
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because it was not presented. In the Court of Appeals, 
plaintiff discussed 78-30-12 only in connection with his 
criticism of the Ellis equal protection analysis. (See Slip 
Op., Add. 10.) At no time, before now, has plaintiff asserted 
the separate argument that he adopted the child by 
acknowledgment, precluding application of 78-30-4. Accordingly, 
under long-standing rules of appellate review, this Court may 
not address the issue. E.g., Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 
1088 (Utah 1985); New Mexico Livestock Board v. Dose, supra, 607 
P.2d at 608-09. 
Even if the issue had been timely raised, the evidence in 
the record could not possibly support a claim of adoption by 
acknowledgment. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, adoption by 
acknowledgment requires much more than merely acknowledging 
paternity and having "some minimal contact" with the child over 
a period of three or four days. (Brief of Pet. at 46.) It 
requires (1) public acknowledgment by the father; (2) receipt of 
the child into the father's family; and (3) treatment of the 
child as legitimate. Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 
1979). In Slade this Court found adoption by acknowledgment on 
the grounds that the father was present at the birth, paid the 
expenses of birth, placed his name on the birth certificate, 
timely registered paternity pursuant to 78-30-4(3), had regular 
custody of the child, and treated the child as his own for the 
first two years of the child's life. Id. at 899-900. In In re 
Adoption of T.R.F., 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988), cited by 
plaintiff, the unwed father was held to have adopted his child 
by acknowledgment because his name was on the child's birth and 
baptismal records; he provided substantial support for the 
child; and he visited or lived with the child and the child's 
mother, often taking personal custody of the child, for 
significant periods during the child's first five years of 
life. Id. at 907-08. Without again detailing the deficiencies 
in plaintiff's parent-child relationship, suffice it to say he 
does not come close to adoption by acknowledgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should either reverse 
the Court of Appeals decision with respect to state action and 
dismiss the appeal, or affirm the decision in all respects. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
By: sZK.*Z#e. &~&1&>A^ 
David M. McConkie 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
-46-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and 
correct copies of RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, postage prepaid, this 
day of April, 1989, to the following: 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Petitioner 
^^LJe^ ^ ? X V 
-47-
ADDENDUM 
Index 
Item Page 
1. Court of Appeals Opinion 1 
2. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order Denying Preliminary Injunction 17 
3. Judgment 21 
4. Order Denying Summary Reversal 
and Notice of Hearing 23 
5. Order 24 
6. Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari . . 25 
7. Complaint 26 
8. Affidavit of Harold Brown 30 
9. Affidavit of Penni Jean Paxman 32 
10. Affidavit of Elda C. Bowen 37 
11. Affidavit of John E. Brockert 41 
12. Constitutional Provisions 45 
13. Statutory Provisions 46 
-48-
R E C E I V E D 
CEP 16 1333 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
L.D.S. Social" Services, John 
Doe and Jane Doe, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880177-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
GARFF, Judge: 
^ S / Clerk of i i-
u:an Court ot 
151988 
Appellant Steven Swayne appeals an order denying him 
custody of his illegitimate child and seeks attorney fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 
(1987) unconstitutionally deprived him of his parental rights. 
We reverse in part and affirm in part. 
Appellant and the mother, P., are the unwed parents of the 
child whose custody is at issue. Appellant and P. began dating 
and having sexual relations in late 1985. 
While they were dating, P. supported appellant by allowing 
him to use her car and by giving him money for his apartment 
rent and other expenses. During this period of time, appellant 
was also dating and having sexual relations with other women. 
Prior to dating P., appellant had fathered another child out of 
wedlock, who was born in February 1986. Appellant signed 
papers consenting to that child's adoption on February 9, 1986. 
Appellant became aware of the pregnancy in October 1986. 
He initially became angry, denying that the baby was his. 
However, in April 1987, he informed members of his family that 
he was the father of the child. His family then held a baby 
shower for P. Appellant also approached his sister about 
raising the child until such time as he became "more stable." 
During the pregnancy, appellant and P. resided in Salt Lake 
County but did not live together. Prior to the baby's birth, 
appellant indicated that he did not intend to marry anybody, 
including P., because wit didn't appeal" to him. He suggested 
to P. that if she decided to keep the baby, she could live with 
his mother so long as she supported herself and paid half of 
the rent. He never offered to live with her and the baby as a 
family unit. However, after P. relinquished the baby, 
appellant then offered to marry her -on paper" because it 
-would make the baby legitimate.- He told P. that they did not 
have to live together and that she would not need to tell her 
parents, but that such an arrangement would make their legal 
case better. 
P. informed appellant in March 1987 that her parents wanted 
her to relinquish the baby for adoption. Appellant responded 
that adoption should be P.'s decision, and that if she did not 
want the baby she could give it to him. 
In March 1987, P. made an appointment with respondent, 
L.D.S. Social Services,1 to discuss placing the baby for 
adoption, but did not keep the appointment because she was 
undecided as to what to do. Although she had considered 
keeping the baby and living with appellant's mother, she was 
uncertain that she would be able to meet the financial 
requirements for that arrangement. 
P. gave birth to a daughter on June 4, 1987. Appellant was 
present in the delivery room during the birth and visited with 
P. and the child during the two days they were in the hospital. 
Appellant was not present in the hospital room when the 
nurse filled out the birth certificate and informed P. that 
appellant had to sign an acknowledgment of paternity form in 
front of a notary public to have his name entered as the father 
on the baby's birth certificate. When appellant later visited 
P., she had the form in her hospital room and informed him that 
he had to sign it. He did not sign it. Consequently, the 
birth certificate does not indicate the identity of the father. 
Later, appellant denied ever having seen the acknowledgment 
form, but stated that he had told P. he wanted to put his name 
on the birth certificate. He admitted, however, that he knew 
1. L.D.S. Social Services was licensed during the relevant 
time period by the State of Utah as a qualified child placement 
agency pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-l (1984) (repealed 
1988), but receives no governmental funding and has no 
governmental agency or entity involved in its internal 
operation, affairs, or decisions except as expressly authorized 
by the licensing statute. 
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he was supposed to sign something in the hospital to get his 
name on the birth certificate. 
On Saturday June 6, 1987, P. was discharged from the 
hospital. P.'s mother assumed financial responsibility and 
took P. and the baby to her home. Appellant did not pay any cf 
the hospital bills but did eventually pay $45 toward the 
obstetrician's bill. 
P.'s mother made an appointment with respondent for June 8, 
1987, so that P. could discuss placing the baby for adoption. 
On June 8, P. brought the baby to appellant's apartment for 
a visit. She did not inform him that she was planning to place 
the baby for adoption. The same day, P. and her parents took 
the baby to respondent where a counselor explained the adoption 
process to them. During this meeting, P. told the counselor 
that appellant had no interest in marriage nor in living with 
and supporting her and the baby. 
The counselor told P. that the decision to place the baby 
for adoption was hers alone to make and that if she was not 
sure, she could place the baby in temporary foster care until 
she decided. P. decided that it was in the baby's best 
interest to place her for adoption. She then signed an 
affidavit and release relinquishing custody of the baby to 
respondent to place her for adoption, stating that she was 
doing this of her own free will and choice, and that she 
understood what she was doing.2 
2. P. later testified that she was emotionally unstable at the 
time because she was concerned over appellant's lack of 
commitment to her and because of parental pressure in that her 
parents had told her that she could have no contact with her 
family if she kept the baby. She also stated that she did not 
tell the counselor much about her relationship with appellant 
because her parents, who did not like him, were in the room 
with her. However, P., "[a]fter considering all the 
circumstances, such as Steven's lack of interest in me and the 
baby, my inability to support and rear the baby alone, the 
problems of bringing a . . . baby into a possible marriage with 
another man, and the need of the baby to have a good home," 
chose to relinquish the baby. Her articulated reasons for 
relinquishing indicate that, despite the emotional turmoil she 
was going through, she had thought out and deliberately made an 
uncoerced decision. 
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During the meeting, the counselor telephoned the Bureau of 
Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and inquired 
whether an acknowledgment of paternity had been filed for the 
child. She was informed that one had not been filed. Because 
it was late in the day, the counselor permitted P. to take the 
baby home that night and bring her back the following day. 
On June 9, P. and the baby visited appellant at his 
apartment. She did not inform him of the relinquishment, but 
told him that she was going to California and was taking the 
baby with her. She testified that she was afraid to tell him 
about the relinquishment because of his recent interest in the 
child, his potential retaliation against her family, and 
because he was upset that she was going to California. At 5:00 
that afternoon, P. gave custody of the baby to respondent and 
left for California the following day, June 10. During this 
trip, she called appellant each day and pretended that she had 
the child with her. 
Respondent transferred custody of the baby to the adoptive 
parents on June 12, 1987. The child has resided with the 
adoptive parents ever since. 
On June 13, P. called appellant's family and, because she 
was afraid to tell appellant the truth, told them that the baby 
was dead. Appellant's mother called the hospital in California 
to see if it had any record of the baby and discovered the 
deception. When appellant called P. back, she admitted her 
deception, informed appellant of the adoption, and agreed to 
return to Salt Lake City to help him attempt to gain custody of 
the child. 
On June 15, appellant filed an acknowledgment of paternity 
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics. He and P. filed an 
affidavit to amend the child's birth certificate to add his 
name as the father and to give the child his last name. They 
then went to respondent to ask for the child, but were advised 
by the counselor that it was too late, the child had already 
been placed with adoptive parents, and that they would have to 
contact their lawyers. 
On June 29, appellant brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
in Federal District Court, requesting custody of the child. 
Judge J. Thomas Greene found that the federal court had 
jurisdiction over the case because state action was present and 
tbe persons involved in the adoption were state actors. 
However, at respondent's request, Judge Greene elected to 
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abstain to allow the state courts to interpret section 78-30-4, 
dismissing the case on September 3, 1987. 
Appellant then filed this state court action on September 
7, 1987. On September 24, 1987, he filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting respondent from continuing 
to deny him custody of the child during the pendency of the 
state action. 
On December 31, 1987, after an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial judge denied appellant's motion, specifically finding 
that: (1) Hit was not impossible for [appellant] to have filed 
his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date the child 
was relinquished for adoption-; (2) appellant, throughout P.'s 
pregnancy, -did not behave in a manner consistent with that of 
a concerned, committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an 
intent or desire to assume the responsibilities of parenthood 
or to keep and rear the child-; and (3) appellant, if awarded 
custody of the child, would relinquish her to his sister to 
care for, rather than caring for her himself. 
On February 24, 1988, respondent moved for summary judgment, 
A hearing on this motion was held on March 4, 1988. The 
court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, 
dismissed appellant's action, and awarded costs to respondent, 
finding that: (1) there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact; (2) respondent's acts did not constitute state 
action; and (3) section 78-30-4 was valid on its face and as 
applied under the due process and equal protection provisions 
of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
On March 15, 1987, appellant filed a notice of appeal 
before this Court. His appeal raises the following issues: 
(1) Did respondent's conduct constitute sufficient -state 
action" to invoke constitutional protections? (2) If so, does 
section 78-30-4 (1987), as applied to the facts in this case, 
violate the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution, or the due process 
provisions of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution? (3) Does section 78-30-4 violate the provisions 
of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution? 
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STATE ACTION 
The fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and 
due process apply "only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property is by governmental 'state action' rather than by 
purely private action.- Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670 
F.Supp. 1537, 1540 (D.Utah 1987). This case involves the 
termination of appellant's parental rights, a liberty interest 
which has repeatedly been recognized as worthy of 
constitutional protection by the United States Supreme Court. 
Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Luoar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), delineated a two-prong test for 
determining whether state action was involved in a 
deprivation: (1) the deprivation must be caused by the 
exercise of a state-created right or privilege, and (2) the 
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor. J&. at 941; accord Dirks 
v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Respondent argues that its conduct in placing the baby for 
adoption did not constitute state action because the adoptive 
placement of children is not the exclusive prerogative of the 
state, so is not a state-created right or privilege. Further, 
because respondent receives no state funding and has no 
governmental control over its internal affairs, it is not a 
state actor. However, this argument sidesteps the real issue, 
whether respondent may be considered to be a state actor in 
terminating appellant's parental rights through the operation 
of section 78-30-4, rather than in placing appellant's child 
for adoption. 
Prior Utah cases interpreting section 78-30-4, although not 
explicitly addressing this state action issue, assume the 
existence of state action in the operation of this statute. 
For example, the Utah Supreme Court, in Wells v. Children's Aid 
Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984) (quoting In re 
Bover, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1981)), stated that "[w]hen 
state action impinges on fundamental rights, due process 
requires standards which clearly define the scope of 
permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on 
those rights." 
We, therefore, concur with the finding of the United States 
District Court in Swavne, that state action indeed existed in 
the present circumstances, because (1) - [undoubtedly, the 
State was responsible for the statute"; Swavne. 670 F.Supp. at 
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1541 (quoting Luoar, 457 U.S. at 938); and (2) the statute 
involved is self-operative and mandates the termination of 
appellant's parental rights. Id* As Judge Greene explained: 
The State of Utah, not a private party, 
has made an official policy decision that 
any time custody of an illegitimate child 
is- relinquished by the mother, the 
father's parental rights will be 
automatically cut off unless a notice of 
paternity previously has been filed by the 
biological father. That state decision to 
terminate the father's parental rights is 
implemented through the actor or actors 
who accept the child for placement, 
whether a state entity, a private licensed 
adoption agency, or any other person, for 
example an attorney. It would be a total 
fiction to allow the state to remove 
itself from its decision to cut off 
parental rights simply because a private 
party triggers operation of the statute. 
The only fair conclusion is that such a 
private party becomes a "state actor" when 
his or her actions bring the statute into 
play so as to effectuate the 
pre-determined state decision to terminate 
parental rights. 
Id. at 1541-42 (emphasis in original). Judge Greene also noted 
that even though a private party may deprive a parent of the 
physical custody of his child, only the state may irrevocably 
sever all parental rights. Thus, state action is present in 
the operation of section 78-30-4. Id. at 1542. 
In view of this determination, we reverse the lower 
court's finding that state action did not exist. Because we 
have determined state action does exist in the operation of 
section 78-30-4, the question becomes whether this state action 
has deprived appellant of his constitutional rights. 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Appellant first argues that section 78-30-4, as applied to 
these facts, violates his constitutional right to equal 
protection under the United States Constitution. He asserts 
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that the similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child 
are given different legal rights solely on the basis of their 
sex since the mother's consent is required prior to any 
adoption of the child regardless of whether she is willing to 
fulfill her parental responsibilities while the father has the 
right to consent to the child's adoption only if he files an 
acknowledgment of paternity indicating his willingness and 
intent to support the child pursuant to section 78-30-4. 
-The essence of equal protection is that legislative 
classifications resulting in differing treatment for different 
persons must be based on actual differences that are reasonably 
related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation." 
Eipyntjun Fuel Svpplv Co, vt Salt LeKe City Corp./ 752 p.2d 884, 
887 (Utah 1988)• Although appellant recognizes the legitimacy 
of the purposes of section 78-30-4, which are to speedily 
identify those persons who will assume the parental role over 
illegitimate children and to facilitate immediate and 
continuing physical care of and emotional bonding opportunities 
for such children, Wells, 681 P.2d at 204, he alleges that the 
classifications of section 78-30-4 are based on differences 
that are not reasonably related to these purposes. He first 
states that the statute defeats its objective by failing to 
require the mother of an illegitimate child to take action to 
identify herself as a willing parent as fathers are required to 
do since an unfit and indifferent mother can prevent the 
adoption of her child and, thus, fail to provide appropriate 
physical care and emotional bonding opportunities for the 
child. He then states that the statutory objective is also 
defeated because it results in gender-based discrimination 
against "identified, present, and willing fathers" who would, 
in fact, provide the necessary care and bonding opportunities 
for the child, and that an indifferent mother can arbitrarily 
deprive such a father of his parental rights under the 
statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ellis v. Social Services 
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-dav Saints. 
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), has held that section 78-30-4 does 
not, on its face, violate the equal protection rights of an 
unwed father because the father's parental rights are the same 
as the mother's and the same as if the child had been born 
legitimate, providing he timely files his acknowledgment of 
paternity pursuant to the statute. Where the father fails to 
come forward by timely filing an acknowledgment of paternity or 
by developing a substantial relationship with the child, the 
equal protection clause does not preclude the state from 
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terminating his parental rights. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380, 394 (1979). 
In Wells, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Elli's, finding 
that there are reasonable bases for statutory differentiation 
between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers who file 
an acknowledgment of paternity and those who do not. Wells, 
681 P.2d at 204. The court also found that these 
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve the proper 
governmental objectives of (1) promptly identifying those 
fathers who will acknowledge parental responsibilities, and (2) 
speedily making children available for adoption. !£. The 
Wells court, although recognizing that many unwed fathers are 
unidentified and uninterested, stated that: 
fathers who have Hfulfilled a parental 
role over a considerable period of time 
are entitled to a high degree of 
protection,- whereas unwed fathers -whose 
relationships to their children are merely 
biological or very attenuated" are 
entitled to a lesser degree of protection. 
. . . . -When an unwed father 
demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by 
•com[ing] forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child,1 his interest in 
personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due 
process clause. . . . But the mere 
existence of a biological link does not 
merit equivalent constitutional 
protection.* 
Id. at 203 (quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982) 
and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983)) (emphasis 
in original). 
On the other hand, unlike unwed fathers, unwed mothers are 
"automatically identified by virtue of their role in the 
process of birth." Wells, 681 P.2d at 203. However, if shown 
to be an unfit or indifferent parent on account of cruelty, 
neglect, or desertion of the child, a mother may have her 
parental rights judicially terminated and the child put up for 
adoption without her consent pursuant to section 78-30-4(1). 
Her parental rights will be terminated if she is shown to be 
unwilling to fulfill her parental responsibilities. 
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Thus, appellant's argument that the statutory 
classifications are based on gender differences that are not 
reasonably related to the statutory purposes fails. 
Appellant next argues that we should not follow the Utah 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Ellis because, as he asserts, that 
opinion was based upon inherently contradictory statutory 
provisions found in sections 78-30-4 and 78-30-12. He argues 
that the protection afforded unwed fathers under section 
78-30-12 is illusory because a father who has publicly 
acknowledged his child may lose his parental rights anyway by 
failing to file under section 78-30-4. 
In In the Matter of the Adoption of T.R.F. v. Felan. slip 
op. 870307-CA (Utah Ct. App. August 31, 1988), this Court 
recently rejected this argument, holding that these two 
statutes are not inconsistent but operate independently in the 
appropriate factual contexts: 
We interpret the statutes [sections 
77-30-4 and 77-30-12] as follows: when 
the unwed father acknowledges his child, 
within the meaning of the acknowledgment 
statute [section 77-30-12], prior to the 
mother's relinquishment of the child or 
prior to the filing of the petition for 
adoption, then the father need not comply 
with the requirements of the paternity 
statute [section 77-30-4]. However, if 
the claimed acts of acknowledgment occur 
after the mother!s relinquishment or after 
the petition for adoption has been filed, 
then the paternity statute [section 
77-30-4] governs. 
Id. at p. 18. Thus, contrary to appellant's argument, the 
protections offered the unwed father under section 78-30-12 are 
not illusory because section 78-30-4 does not apply to him if 
he has fulfilled the adoption by acknowledgment requirements. 
He is protected under both sections. 
If an unwed father establishes a substantial relationship 
over a number of years with his children, his rights cannot be 
extinguished without his consent under section 78-30-12. 
Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1255. Similarly, a caring, involved unwed 
father may file pursuant to section 78-30-4 even before such a 
substantial relationship has developed to acquire the same 
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rights. The unwed mother cannot/ then, arbitrarily divest him 
of parental rights and the unwed father has the same rights to 
consent to the adoption of his child as the mother. 
Although appellant argues that section 78-30-4 violates his 
constitutional right to equal protection as applied, he raises 
no discernable argument on facts unique to this case: He 
failed to file an acknowledgement of paternity prior to the 
relinquishment of the child, and failed to communicate concern 
for and interest in the child apart from his few visits with 
her. He did not come forth after the birth of the child to 
assert his claim to paternity nor did he agree to support the 
child. He denied paternity for the major part of the pregnancy 
and, even after admitting paternity, never indicated to the 
mother or to anyone else any desire to marry her, to live 
together with her and the child, or even to personally raise 
the child. As such, it is not unjust for him to be classified 
with other similarly situated unwed fathers who have lost their 
parental rights by not coming forward to acknowledge their 
parental responsibilities. 
Appellant's fourth argument is that section 78-30-4 
violates the equal protection provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. "As a general rule, we will not engage in state 
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is 
briefed.- State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 
1988). Because appellant has not set forth a separate state 
constitutional analysis in his brief, we do not respond to this 
argument. Merely stating that the statute violates the Utah 
Constitution without arguing the specific conflicts is not 
sufficient. We find that appellant's equal protection argument 
fails. 
DUE PROCESS 
Appellant asserts that section 78-30-4 violates the due 
process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
He argues that the statute operates to terminate an unwed 
father's parental rights before any adjudication of abandonment 
occurs, thus making failure to file an acknowledgment of 
paternity an irrebuttable presumption that he has abandoned his 
child. Relying on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 
(1971), which states that procedures cannot stand which 
"explicitly [disdain] present realities in deference to past 
880177-CA 1 1 
ii 
formalities,"3 he asserts that the statute violates due 
process because the fact presumed, abandonment, does not follow 
from his actual behavior in that he visited the child daily for 
the four days following the child's birth, invited his family 
to visit her, publicly acknowledged his paternity, and never 
clearly expressed an intention to relinquish his parental 
rights. 
This argument is, essentially, an attack on the 
constitutionality of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has 
already settled this issue in We11s. Applying an even more 
stringent standard of review than required under the United 
States Constitution because of the fundamental nature of 
parental rights, the Wells court determined that section 
78-30-4 is facially valid under the due process clause of the 
Utah Constitution because (1) the state has a compelling 
interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume 
a parental role over newborn illegitimate children, and (2) the 
statute is narrowly tailored to achieve these purposes because 
there is no infringement of the unwed father's rights not 
essential to the statute's purposes. Wells, 681 P.2d at 
206-07. 
Further, appellant misconstrues the import of the statute. 
Because of his unwed status, he does not have parental rights 
subject to termination until he asserts them by either filing 
an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section 78-30-4 or 
by establishing a substantial relationship with the child 
pursuant to section 78-30-12. If he does either of the above, 
he preserves his parental rights. If he fails to come forward, 
he has no parental rights to abandon. The statute cannot 
create an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment where 
parental rights do not exist. 
3. Stanley is inapposite to this case because of 
distinguishable facts: Peter Stanley was deprived of his 
children with whom he had lived and had raised for eighteen 
years. Upon the death of the children's mother, they were 
placed with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an Illinois 
statute which required that children of unwed fathers become 
wards of the state upon the death of their mothers. Stanley, 
405 U.S. at 646. The Court found this statute to be 
unconstitutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption 
that unwed fathers were unfit parents. In the present case, 
appellant has not developed a comparable substantial 
relationship with his child. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the nature-of this 
subject matter makes a firm cutoff date reasonable, if not 
essential, because of the disruption to the children involved 
by the protracted litigation that a contrary holding would 
produce. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 
755-56 (Utah 1984). Further, marriage is the institution 
established by society for the procreation and rearing of 
children, and because of the disproportionate number of social 
problems involving illegitimate children, it is not 
too harsh to require that those 
responsible for bringing children into the 
world outside the established institution 
of marriage should be required either to 
comply with those statutes that accord 
them the opportunity to assert their 
parental rights or to yield to the method 
established by society to raise children 
in a manner best suited to promote their 
welfare. 
Id. at 756; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. 
Appellant also argues that section 78-30-4, as applied, 
violates his due process rights. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that situations may arise in which it is impossible, 
through no fault of his own, for an unwed father to file the 
required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar. In re 
Adoption of Babv Bov Doe. 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986); 
Ellis. 615 P.2d at 1256. In such a situation, due process 
requires that the unwed father be permitted to show that he was 
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
statute. If the father successfully shows that termination of 
his parental rights is contrary to basic notions of due process 
and if he comes forward within a reasonable time after the 
baby's birth, he is deemed to have complied with the statute. 
Ellis. 615 P.2d at 1256. 
Such situations existed in Ellis and in Babv Bov Doe. In 
Ellis, the child's mother and father resided in California. 
The mother left California just prior to the child's birth 
without advising the father as to where the birth was to 
occur. When the child was born, she declared the father to be 
unknown, and relinquished the child four days later. The court 
found that the father was entitled to an opportunity to show, 
as a factual matter, that he could not reasonably have expected 
his baby to be born in Utah. I£. at 1256. 
Likewise, in Babv Bov Doe, the father was not a Utah 
resident and had spent less than a week in the state. Prior to 
the baby's birth, the mother had told the father that she would 
move to Arizona with him, thus alleviating any concern he might 
have had about a potential adoption. The father then travelled 
to Arizona, found employment and a place to live, and .moved the 
couple's belongings from California to Arizona. Because all 
parties were aware of the father's intent and desire to raise 
the child, the mother's family deliberately withheld 
information about the child's birth to avoid his obstruction of 
the adoption. The baby was born early while the father was 
travelling from California to Arizona. Consequently, the 
father was unaware of the birth for three days, and only became 
aware of it one day after the petition for adoption had been 
filed. This father successfully showed that the termination of 
his parental rights was contrary to the basic notions of due 
process and that he came forward within a reasonable time after 
the baby's birth. Thus, the court deemed him to have complied 
with the statute. Babv Bov Doe, 717 P.2d at 690-91. 
This "impossibility" exception is inapplicable, however, 
in cases which do not involve situations where it is impossible 
for the father to file the required notice through no fault of 
his own. Wells. 681 P.2d at 207. 
The Wells court found that no impossibility existed under 
the following facts: The birth occurred in the same state as 
the father's residence. Neither the child's mother nor the 
adoption agency were involved in an effort to prevent the 
father from learning of the birth or from asserting his 
parental rights. Neither knew at the time of the 
relinquishment that the father was seeking to assert his 
parental rights. The father had advance notice of the expected 
time of the birth and the fact that the mother intended to 
relinquish the child for adoption. Further, the father had 
advice of counsel on filing the required form, and had a copy 
of the form provided by a social worker. ifiU at 207-08. 
Likewise, in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, the court 
determined that section 78-30-4 was not unconstitutionally 
applied: Both parents were Utah residents. Prior to the 
birth, the mother had told the father she would not live with 
nor marry him and that she was considering adoption. Together, 
the couple attended a counseling session at the agency which 
later took custody of the child for adoption. The father 
visited the mother and child in the hospital prior to the time 
the child was relinquished. On the day the child was 
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relinquished, the mother called the father and told him to come 
to the hospital if he wanted to see the baby one last time, 
when the father went to the hospital, he did not protest the 
mother's decision to place the child for adoption, but did 
attempt to sign the birth certificate. He then filed a notice 
of paternity after the baby was relinquished for adoption. 
Babv Bov Doe, 717 P.2d at 690; Sanchez. 680 P.2d at 75. 
In the present situation, both appellant and P. were 
residents of Salt Lake County at the time the child was born. 
Appellant was aware of the time and location of the child's 
birth. As in Sanchez, no one had attempted to withhold from 
appellant any information regarding the child's birth. 
Appellant had made it clear to P. prior to the child's birth 
that he was not going to marry her, live with her, or assume 
any financial responsibility for her or for the baby. As in 
Sanchez, appellant was present at the birth and visited P. and 
the child in the hospital. Appellant knew of the possibility 
of the child's adoption from March 1987 when P. told him that 
her parents wanted her to relinquish the child. He told her 
that adoption should be her decision. At the hospital, 
appellant was instructed by P. that he had to sign an 
acknowledgment of paternity to appear as the father on the 
child's birth certificate, but did not sign it. P. signed the 
relinquishment on June 8th, four days after the child was born, 
and surrendered custody on June 9th. Although reprehensible, 
P.'s attempt to mislead appellant about the relinquishment by 
telling him that she had taken the child to California and that 
the child had died was irrelevant because it came after the 
fact. 
Appellant had every reasonable opportunity to register 
prior to the act of relinquishment. He also had actual 
knowledge of the requirement to register, not only from P.'s 
informing him of this necessity at the hospital, but also 
because he, himself, had relinquished his rights to a previous 
child a year earlier. 
These facts more closely resemble those in Wells and 
Sanchez, in which the impossibility exception was inapplicable, 
than those in Ellis and Babv Bov Doe. We concur with the trial 
court and find that appellant had an opportunity to file his 
acknowledgment of paternity, and that it was not impossible for 
him to do so prior to the relinquishment through no fault of 
his own. As the Sanchez court stated, w[i]t is of no 
constitutional importance that the father came close to 
complying with the statute." Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. We, 
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therefore, hold that section 78-30-4 was not unconstitutionally 
applied to appellant. 
OPEN COURTS 
Finally, appellant raises the issue of whether section 
78-30-4 violates the open court provisions in article I section 
11 of the Utah Constitution. Appellant did not raise this 
issue below, but first raised it on appeal to this court. As a 
general rule, we do not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal, so decline to address this issue. Rekward v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
We affirm in part and reverse in part. We reverse the 
trial court's ruling concerning state action, but affirm the 
order denying appellant custody of the child. Because 
appellant is not the prevailing party, we do not address the 
issue of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Each party is 
to beajf^iTts^wn costs on appeal. 
WE CONCUR: 
/ ^ ^ ^ fQ* U^f^y^ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Normal H. Jackson, ^fcJge 
880177-CA 16 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Kelson, Mo. 3641 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
lEltUke County Utah 
DECS 1198? . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
P i a ) n 111' / , 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
AAt£rt>£Z> 
FINDINGS OF FACT # 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER DENYING 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
C'ivi i No I -87 » 0 5 9 6 Y 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Thie matter came plaintiff's Motion ici 
Preliminary Injunction and was heard before the Honorable Judge 
Homer Wilkinson at a special hearing on November 3 3 1987. 
Plaintiff was reprepenleil hy h\\ 1 ,y L Walker and M David 
Eckersley, and defendants were represented by David M. McConkie 
and Merrill F. Nelson following the hearing, 
the mat tc i unde , ad isement . Based on the testimony and 
exhibits presented at the hearing and the memoranda submitted 
the parties, the Court hereby enters Urn follow In yi I indings c f 
lusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Penny Paxman is the natural mother of a child born 
out of wedlock in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 4, 1987. 
Plaintiff is the unwed father of the baby* 
2. Both plaintiff and the mother resided in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, throughout the pregnancy and during all 
times relevant to this matter. 
3. Plaintiff first learned of the pregnancy in October 
of 1986. 
4. Plaintiff and the mother have never been married and 
did not live with each other during the pregnancy. Prior to the 
relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff 
never offered to marry the mother, to live with the mother, or 
to financially support the mother or the baby. 
5. Plaintiff and the mother discussed during the 
pregnancy that the mother's parents wanted her to relinquish the 
baby for adoption. 
6. Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of 
the birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital 
following the birth. 
7. Plaintiff was informed of the need to sign an 
acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital in order to 
have his name entered on the baby's birth certificate as its 
father. The form was provided and made available to plaintiff 
in the hospital but he did not sign it. The baby's birth 
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certificate shows father and the baby was given the mothei& 
surname. 
6 Prior to the relinquishment, plaintiff had assumed 
none of the financial responsibility for the hospital expenses 
01 t'huf baby 1 P BL • i i . 
9 Or June 8, 1987 the mother signed an Affidavit and 
Release relinquishing care and custody r; f Ihe ft": • 1 •,» f. defends 
LDS Social Set Ires to place the baby for adoption. IDS Social 
Services subsequently placed the baby with adoptive parents, 
with whom the baby has since resided. 
If, The mother did not notify plaintiff before 
relinquishing the baby for adoption. 
II I Oi ii Ji i II: i ,c ] 3 I! 9IE ; I 1 i c • * • - plaintiff that 
she had relinquished the baby for adoption. 
the plaintiff registered his 
aclr edgmen ;J i t he Bureau of vital Statistics 
and applied for an amendment to the birth certificate to 
designate himself as father of the child. 
impossible for plaintiff to have filed 
his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date the child was 
relinquished for adoption. 
14 Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not behave 
in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, committed 
father, nor did he clearly art. leu I • I,"1 a In lei it vi desire to 
assume the responsibilities of parenthood ox to keep and rear 
the child. 
_3_ 
15. Plaintiff testified that if he were awarded custody 
of the child he would relinquish it to his sister to care for. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In view of controlling case law, it is unlikely that 
plaintiff will prevail on his claims that Utah Code Annotated 
§78-30-4(3) violates the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, either on its 
face or as applied. 
2. It does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff 
would suffer irreparable injury by leaving the baby in adoptive 
custody pending resolution of the merits of the lawsuit. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and the Court having fully considered the evidence and 
arguments presented, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. 
DATED this a * day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
M *-•'* U> ft fc 
i 
Homer Wilkinson 
H
'
U
 -At'iUJ/ District Judge 
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David M. McConkie, No, 2154 
Merrill F. Nelaon, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant8 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
If- THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, ! Civi] Mo 0-8^-05969 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, : 
j Judge Homer Wilkinaon 
Defendants. : 
Defendanta' Motion for Summer> linlgrTienl cin^ m for 
I' tfiiii i > ng before the Honorable Homer Wilkinaon on March 4„ 1988 
Plaintiff vaa represented by M. David Eckeraley; Defendants 
were repreaented by Davi il M If : €• ii):i lki e ai :1 M e i: i :1 11 f Ne 1 aon. 
The Con in t, having reviewed and considered the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, memoranda and exhibita aubmitted fa} f1e 
parties, as well rom the prior 
hearing on plaintiff a motion for preliminary injunction, hereby 
enters final judgment as follows: 
] IT>f»' record i™ c i if • M" 11! i; ,i genuine issue as to any 
material fact. 
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2. The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute 
state action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or under the due process and 
equal protection provisions of either the United States 
Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 is valid, on its face and as 
applied to the facts of this case, under both the due process 
and equal protection provisions of both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. 
4. Defendants* motion for summary judgment is hereby 
granted, and plaintiff9s action is dismissed. 
5. Defendants are awarded their costs pursuant to 
U.R.Civ.P. 54(d). 
DATED this / I day of March, 1988. 
Approved as to Form: 
2* 
M. Divid Eckereley/? 
Hon. Homer Wilkinson 
Dis tr ic t Court Judge 
QerruU ••** 
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APR 131983 
ClerX of the Coon 
O u a Court of APDMIS 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Plaint it I and Appellant, 
v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, John Doe 
and Jane Doe, 
Defendants and Respondent 
ORDER DENYING 
SUMMARY REVERSAL 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Court of Appeals No. 880177-CA 
Appellant's motion for summary reversal of (lie trial court s, 
judqmeni i«, hf?Mjhy ilen i »'il. 
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby 
scheduled for hearing on Monday, April 18, 1988 at the hour of 1:30 
p.m. 
Dated this /? day of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
'NORMAN H.^^ACKSON, Judge 
APR 14198ft 
O O 
J- I L fc D 
\J 
ORDER 
Case No. 880177-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS *£&**2c**i 
—-OO0OO 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, et al.. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Greenwood (On Law and Motion). 
Appellant's notion for injunction pending appeal is hereby 
denied. 
The Court further determines that the best interests of the 
minor child and of the parties require that this appeal be 
scheduled for expedited briefing and hearing. Therefore, 
pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 2, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Appellant's brief shall be filed with this Court and 
served on or before May 10, 1988; 
2. Respondent's brief shall be filed with this Court and 
served on or before June 9, 1988; 
3. Appellant's reply brief shall be filed with this Court 
on or before June 16, 1988; 
4. All designated portions of the record on appeal shall 
be filed with this Court on or before June 10, 1988; and 
5. Hearing on oral argument shall be held on Tuesday, June 
21, 1988, at 2:00 p.m., before a regularly scheduled panel 
of this Court. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
Regular February Term, 1989 February 16, 1989 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Petitioner and 
Cross-Respondent, 
v. No. 880384 
L.D.S. Social Services, 
John Doe and Jane Doe, 
Respondents and 
Cross-Petitioners. 
Petition foi Wi it nf Certiorari having been considered/ and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, i< is ordered 
that a petition for writ of Certiorari and a cross-petition for Writ 
of Certiorari be, and the same in, granted an prayed. 
25 
Billy L. Walker,Jr. (3358) 
120 North 200 West 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 538-3902 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-0453 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Steven H. Swayne alleges as follows for his 
cause of action against the defendants. 
1. Plaintiff Steven Swayne is the natural father of 
the child Meche' Cymone Paxman, which child was born on June 4, 
1987. 
2. L.D.S. Social Services is a Utah child placing agency 
licensed by the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §55-8a-l, et seq. (Rep.Vol. 6A 1974). 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No: C'B^CSUj 
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3. Defendants John and Jane Doe are individuals residing 
in Salt Lake County whose names are not known to plaintiff but who 
are currently exercising custody and control over the infant child 
of the plaintiff. 
4. Meche1 Cymone Paxman was born on June 4# 1987. 
She is the natural daughter of Steven Swayne and Penni Jean Paxman. 
5. Prior to the birth of the child, plaintiff had publicly 
acknowledged his paternity of the child and had made arrangements 
for the child and its mother to reside with his family following 
the child's birth. 
6. Plaintiff was present at the birth of the child and 
publicly acknowledged his paternity to hospital personnel involved 
in the delivery of and care for the child. 
7. Plaintiff visited the mother and child during 
each day of their hospitalization. On June 9, 1987, he received 
the child into his home following her discharge from the hospital. 
/8. On June 8, 1987, without notice to plaintiff of 
any nature and without his knowledge or consent, Penni Paxman 
executed an affidavit and release whereby she purported to release 
plaintiff's daughter to the care, custody and control of L.D.S. 
Social Services and consented to the placement of the child for 
adoption after a placement made in the sole discretion of L.D.S. 
Social Services. 
9. After receiving the physical custody of Steven 
Swaynefs infant daughter L.D.S. Social Services placed the child 
-2-
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for adoption with John and Jane Doe. Prior to receiving Mr, 
Swayne's daughter L.D.S. Social Services was advised of his 
paternity and of his lack of consent to any placement for adoption. 
10. John and Jane Doe have petitioned the Third Judicial 
District Court of Utah for a Decree of Adoption of Mr. Swayne's 
infant daughter. 
P>1. On June 15, 1987 plaintiff filed an acknowledgement 
of paternity and willingness to support his infant daughter and 
both plaintiff and the child's mother sought to amend the child's 
birth certificate to list plaintiff as the child's father and give 
her the last name of Swayne. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(42 U.S.C. §1983) 
12. The actions of L.D.S. Social Services and John 
and Jane Doe, taken under color of Utah State law by virtue of 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §55-8a-l, et seg. (Rep. Vol. 
6A 1974) and Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 (Supp.1986), constitute a 
deprivation of plaintiff's liberty interest in maintaining custody, 
care and control of his infant daughter in violation of the rights 
conferred on plaintiff by virtue of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
13. The acts of defendants set forth above are in 
violation of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
-3-
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
14. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. $78-30-4 (Supp. 
1986), both as written and as applied to the facts of this case, 
are violative of the Egual Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
of Art. 1 §§7,11, and 24 of the Constitution of Utah. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
15. Plaintiff requests an Order of this Court restoring 
him to the custody, care and control of his infant daughter. 
16. Plaintiff further requests a declaration from this 
Court that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 (Supp. 1986) 
are violative of the United States Constitution and the Constitution 
of Utah. 
17. Plaintiff further requests damages in a reasonable 
sum from defendant L.D.S. Social Services and his costs in this 
action, including reasonable attorneys fees, as provided in 42 
U.S.C. §1988. 
DATED this7// day of September, 1987. 
7V A w i L 4 . / l 
M. D^vid Eckersley 
<%/ UJLJL. 
B i l l ^ V Walker, 3f{ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
- 4 -
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : HAROLD BROWN 
VS. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : Civil No. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, : 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Harold Brown, being first duly sworn, depose and state 
as follows: 
1. I am the Director of LDS Social Services. 
2. LDS Social Services is a private, nonprofit welfare 
agency licensed by the State of Utah as a qualified child 
placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-8a-l et sea. 
3. No governmental agency or entity is involved in the 
internal operations, affairs, or decisions of LDS Social 
Services, except as expressly authorized by the licensing 
statute. 
4. LDS Social Services receives no government funding. 
5. No governmental agency or entity was involved in 
Penny Paxman's relinquishment and LDS Social Services' 
acceptance of the custody and control of her baby on June 8, 
1987, or in the decision to transfer custody and control of the 
baby from LDS Social Services to the adoptive parents. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Harold Brown 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^l3gPdav of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Empires: 
fr -£R -r5r NOTARY"PUBLIC / , /o~ 
Residing in: sJkjy-oT/iJpj CLT7J (sf7iJ_ 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PENNI JEAN PAXMAN 
Civil No. C-87-05969 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SB 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Penni Jean Paxman deposes and states that: 
1. At all times relevant to this action I have resided 
with my parents in their home in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. I began dating Steven Swayne in late 1985 and 
learned in October of 1986 that I had become pregnant by him. 
When I informed Steven that I was pregnant, he became angry and 
at first denied that the baby was his. 
d JJ-0 pUns-itaC ZI/ZJU £)&-&</±^4^ /^ ^  • C^NLZ-C-
3. In approximately Match of 1987, Steven and I 
/?B7 /-*J> 
discussed the fact that my parents wanted me to place the baby 
O eJ 
for adoption- I called LDS Social Services during that same 
month to make an appointment to discuss placing the baby for 
adoption, but later decided to postpone the appointment. 
4. Steven never offered to marry me or to live with and 
support me and the baby. He suggested that, if I did keep the 
baby, I could live with his mother in her apartment. It was 
understood that I would be expected to support myself and pay 
half the rent. 
5. During the time I was dating Steven, I often gave 
him money to pay his apartment rent and other expenses. I knew 
that during the time we were dating, both before and during my 
pregnancy, Steven was also dating and having sexual relations 
with other girls. I also knew that he had previously fathered a 
baby out of wedlock and that the baby had been placed for 
adoption. 
6. My baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on 
June 4, 1987. Steven knew of the birth and visited me in the 
hospital. During one of Steven's visits to the hospital, I 
informed him that in order to have his name entered on the 
baby's birth certificate as the father he would have to sign a 
paternity form. I showed the form to Steven but he did not 
sign it, and his name was not entered on the birth certificate. 
(See attached exhibit.) On June 6, 1987, my baby and I were 
discharged from the hospital and I took the baby home to my 
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parents9 house. Steven has paid none of the hospital expenses 
or expenses to support me and the baby. 
7. On June 8, 1987, I took the baby to LDS Social 
Services to receive counseling regarding placing my baby for 
adoption. My parents went with me. The counselor at LDS Social 
Services, Elda Bowen, explained to me the adoption process. 
When Mrs. Bowen asked about the baby's father, I explained to 
her that Steven had no interest in marriage or in living with 
and supporting me and the baby. Both Mr6. Bowen and my parents 
told me that the decision to place the baby for adoption was 
mine alone to make. Mrs. Bowen told me that if I was not sure 
about placing the baby for adoption, I -*ould place the baby in 
temporary foster care until I made my decision. After 
considering all of the circumstances, such as Steven's lack of 
interest in me and the baby, my inability to support and rear 
the baby alone, the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby 
into a possible marriage with another man, and the needs of the 
baby to have a good home, I decided that it would be best for 
the baby to place her for adoption. 
8. Mrs. Bowen reviewed with me the release form and 
asked me if I understood what I was doing. I told her that I 
understood the form and its effect and that I wanted to do what 
was best for the baby. I then signed the form releasing the 
care and custody of my baby to LDS Social Services. 
-3- 34 
9. I asked Mrs. Bowen if I could take the baby home 
that night and bring her in the next day. Mrs. Bowen agreed, 
and I returned the baby to LDS Social Services the next day. 
DATED this £ ^ day of February, 1988. 
\^^^2-^<l^/%</>>? 
Penni Jean Paxxnan 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Z2^ day of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing in: 
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SALT LAKI CITT - COUNTT EEALTH DEPARTMENT 
DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS 
ES5»ssr It 
. 18 6761 CERTIFICATE OF LIVE 1IRTH vr«Tt m ufw - mmmmtn o» wt*tm 
MWI 
U. f lo lv Crosa H o s p i t a l 
ia*TlftAT9 
\hk&lU&2?%=* '( Vii.uua.ur ""]»Mn!.JHMhU!rt—u.vu.V 
THfSrSTOC«TIFY,thatth«»arruacc^ 
Sta! of tht Divtwon o< Vital Statistics ofSihUkt City-County, Stat* at Utah, hat baan antod har*to. 
Date muad: JUN 1 5 1987 
• Dtrtctor otf Haahh .- .
 : . . Jr DapufyTUfttfrir y 
WARNINttrfVt»ILLiCAtlfCtDUrLICAie,IHIVCOrV^ 
EXHIBIT 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3641 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, s ELDA C. BOWEN 
v. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : C<"<! l.o. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, : 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Elda C. Bowen deposes and states that: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah. 
2. I am an employee of LDS Social Services, a child 
placement agency licensed to receive children for placement or 
adoption pursuant to Title 55, Chapter 8a, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953. 
3. I am employed by LDS Social Services as a social 
worker specializing in counseling with unwed mothers. I have 
been employed in this position by LDS Social Services for the 
past sixteen years. 
9^ 
4. Penny Jean Paxman called the Sandy office of LDS 
Social Services on March 10, 1987 and made an appointment to 
meet with me the next day to discuss possible adoptive place-
ment of the baby she was expecting. Penny subsequently called 
and cancelled the appointment. 
5. Following the birth of Penny's baby, an appoint-
ment was made for me to meet with Penny on June 8, 1987. On 
that day, Penny brought the baby with her to my office to 
discuss placing the baby for adoption. Penny's parents were 
also present at that meeting. I inquired about the baby's 
father, and Penny told me that he had indicated no interest in 
forming a family unit, in supporting the baby, or in planning 
for the baby's future. I explained the adoption process, 
stressed to Penny that whether to relinquish the baby was her 
decision alone, and informed her that she could place the baby 
in temporary foster care until she made her decision. Penny 
decided at that meeting that adoption would be best for the 
baby. 
6. During that same meeting, I telephoned the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and 
inquired whether an Acknowledgement of Paternity had been 
filed for Penny's baby. I was informed that an Acknowledge-
ment had not been filed. 
7. I then showed a relinquishment form to Penny 
entitled "AFFIDAVIT AND RELEASE". (Exhibit A, attached here-
to.) I filled in the preliminary information and read aloud 
~
2
~ 2« 
the entire form from beginning to end as Penny followed 
along. I asked her if she understood the form and the effect 
of signing it and was doing so by her own free will and 
choice. She responded affirmatively to those questions and 
then signed the form. After signing, Penny expressed her 
relief and her belief that it was the right decision. 
8. Penny asked if she could take the baby home 
overnight and return her the next day. I consented, and Penny 
returned the baby to me at my office at 5:00 p.m. on June 9, 
1987. LDS Social Services transferred custody of the baby to 
her adoptive parents on June 12, 1987. 
DATED this ^ L day of February, 1988. 
Elda C. Bowen 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: &%.J&J 
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I, /^f/2-j x*-^  <y ^ /fSi ^ ^ ^^^X/^^1 ^ /be i n g first djiy^s*c-n on Cdtr., ae?ose anj :., 
T That" I am the parent: of a minor child, n a me 1 y /&& fo^/ £, r / ^Avz yw^*fi ^  
born on the y / i ^ ^ / > day of i //,^^yA , 15 £ 7 , at"
 u,r z . £ 
Ccunty of wf.4 ^ State of //T/j./i • 
2. That because I feel the child's best interests will be served, I hereby release 
said child to the care, custody and control of the LDS Social Services,-for placement for 
accption pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated i 55-8a-l et sec. (1953). 
3. That I fully understand and am aware of the fact that by my action, I am releas' 
and do hereby so release, my parental rights with regard to said child, and in fact, authr 
the LDS Social Services to exercise its discretion in the placement of said child. 
4. That, further, I do hereby consent to the legal adoption of said child by these 
persons whom the said LDS Social Services may, in their discretion, designate and apprc\e 
be adopting parents who are able to furnish said child with a proper name, home and care. 
5. That I fully understand and consent that the said LDS Social Services may, in it: 
discretion, release the care, custody, and control over said minor child to another licerst 
child placement agency for adoption and placement within said other agency's discretion, 
if this is deemed necessary to serve the best interests of the child. 
6. That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in 
Courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of determination or release 
and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
7. That I have read the foregoing statement and I fully understand the impact of 
the terms and conditions to which I do agree, and consent; and that my action herein taken 
is of my own free will, executed voluntarily without any coercion, force, or duress, anc 
without any promises of any kind whatsoever, except that the best interests of said child 
tfill be the paramount, controlling factor on its placement. 
l i t r . e s s / ) ' Signature o-f Parent 
itress / 
TATE OF UTAH ) 
JU.NTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the & $ £ day of 0/,^> y • 19 f / , personally appeared before 
' &>^*sn*r ( k f ^ X . ^ g j ^ W rthTsigne- of the foregoing instrurent, *>r: 
Notary PusiIC 
.viecgecyca^.e tnat sne/'fie executes tne same. 
crtrrrissicn empires: _ "797/^L-^^JL^ /.• <T J<s f ? S u'-
',Si* / , /?fy Aacress 
^ 40 
David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : JOHN E. BROCKERT 
vs. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : Civil No. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, : 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John E. Brockert, being first duly sworn deposes and says 
as follows: 
1. I am a director of the Bureau of Vital Records for 
the State of Utah. 
2. The revised Utah vital statistics rules which became 
effective March 17, 1987, specify in Rule 405-3-4 (attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A") that a child born to an unmarried mother 
may not have the father's name entered on a birth certificate 
unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgment of paternity 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 4 1 
3. Rule 3.4 has been in effect since March 17, 1987 and 
has been a requirement since 1972 for all births occurring in 
the State of Utah. 
DATED this 6^3 day of February, 1988. 
Fohn E. Brockert, Director of 
Vital Records 
d 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25* day of 
February, 1988. 
My romrpission Expires: 'omrpission Exp FARY PUB, 
Residing i 
- 2 - 42 
This amendment shall be processed In the manner prescribed In Section 3.2 of 
these rules. 
Rule 3.4 Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents 
A child born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on 
the birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of 
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity 1s signed and received before 
the certificate 1s registered, the father's name and other related Information 
may be entered 1n the appropriate Items on the original certificate. The 
acknowledgement of paternity 1s transmitted with the original certificate to 
the State Registrar, where 1t 1s retained as documentary evidence. 
An acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate is registered 
1s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's Information 
may be added by amendment as specified 1n Rule 3.2. However, 1f another man 
Is shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the 
correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or 
following adoption. 
RULE 4 Oelayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8) 
Rule 4.1 Registration - Ten Oays to One Year 
Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date 
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate In the manner 
prescribed 1n Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Such 
certificate shall not be marked "Delayed." 
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Utah State Department of Health 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY 
BY PARENTS 
rVe 
Father of Child 
and 
lereby acknowledge that 
>f the 
Sex of Child 
(name of father) 
.child born 
Mother of Child 
is the natural father 
Birthdete 
lirthplace 
Hospitel (or address) City County 
Of 
Maiden name of mother Mother's usuel residence 
is our desire that the father's information become a part of the birth certificate of our chilo. 
ame of Child 
^rst Middle Last 
ame of Father 
First 
ge of Father at time of this child's birth 
rthpiace of Father 
gnature (Mother) 
Middle 
Father's Birthdate. 
Lest 
Race of Father 
Address 
I hereby acknowledge paternity of the child identified above. This is to signify my willingness and intent to sup-
port this child to the best of my ability. 
gnature (Father) Address 
bscribed and sworn to before me this day of . 1 9 
(SEAL) 
0HBHS>4$ 10/79 
Signature Notary Public 
Address 
My Commission Expires 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
lection 1. 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State ahall make or enforce any law which 
ahall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor ahall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
tec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
(DA child cannot be adopted without the content of each living parent 
having rightt in relation to taid child, except that content it not necetsary 
from a father or mother who hat been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or content in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it thall appear that the parent or 
parents whose content would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorised to take acknowledgments, 
releaeed hit or her or their control or custody of tuch child to any agency 
licented to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
65, and tuch agency contents, in writing, to tuch adoption or whenever it 
ahall appear that the parent or parents whose content would otherwite be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental lights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and taid agency hat in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of tuch child to any agency licented 
under Chapter 8a, Title 65, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have tike power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release tuch par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the tame upon 
tuch parent's attaining the age of majority. 
(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption tervicet or prior to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. The notice ahall be signed by the registrant and ahall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health ahall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child ahall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of taid child, and the 
content of tuch father to the adoption of tuch child thall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there it no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it ahall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate ahall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question. 
78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his 
family, and otherwise treating it at if it were a legitimate child, thereby 
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption. /\ £ 
